COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT AND SCALING-UP IN URBAN AREAS: THE EVOLUTION OF PUSH/PROSPECT IN ZAMBIA

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Abstract

CARE began PROSPECT (Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and Community Transformation) in 1998. PROSPECT aims to reduce poverty in peri-urban areas of Lusaka. It employs a community-based approach to carry out three types of activities: social empowerment (institution building at the local level), personal empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (mostly water supply schemes).

PROSPECT has attempted to carry out these activities largely through its support of area-based organizations (ABOs) that now form part of city government. The zone development committees (ZDCs) and residents’ development committees (RDCs) are the basic components of the ABO structure. These are community-level representations of municipal government; they are the community’s mechanisms for expressing its voice and driving development.

PROSPECT is itself an extension of an earlier project, PUSH II (Peri-Urban Self-Help Project). PUSH II and PROSPECT are fundamentally about developing community-based and community-driven development (CDD) mechanisms and strengthening community capacities to identify and respond to community needs. The paper examines the scaling-up experience of PUSH II and PROSPECT, looking especially at the mechanisms of CDD, the ABOs.

Evolution of PUSH and PROSPECT

PUSH I (1991–94) was a food-for-work (FFW) program sponsored by the Government of Zambia, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The objective of PUSH was to alleviate the negative effects of structural adjustment and stabilization and of the 1991–92 drought on well-being and food security.

In the second phase of PUSH, PUSH II (1994–97), CARE sought to move from direct implementation to facilitation of implementation and to building the capacity of the
community to identify development and act upon development needs. A new donor, the United Kingdom’s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and CARE’s senior staff encouraged this more community-driven approach. PUSH II initiated work in three compounds in Lusaka in a learning and “process” project. That is, communities determined project interventions only after initial participatory assessments.

PROSPECT scaled up from the 3 compounds of PUSH II to 11. After the initial process orientation of PUSH, while maintaining a community-based focus, PROSPECT began to revert to a more traditional project arrangement. PROSPECT’s proposal, for instance, specifically identified water provision and microfinance as interventions.

Facilitating Factors and Challenges

Although supposedly water supply was to be simply an entry point for more in-depth work to build up the ABOs and encourage CDD, CARE’s efforts to follow up on this have been less than optimal. The two principal factors that militated against this seem to have been (1) political conflict between the ABOs and the traditional hierarchical power structures and (2) the difficulty of structuring organizational incentives to encourage consistent long-term actions to support CDD.

As CDD scales up, political tension is likely. The spreading of the RDCs threatened the authority of the city councilors, who traditionally have been in charge of development in the compounds (although not necessarily effectively). With PROSPECT, residents saw the RDCs managing substantial resources and promoting investment beneficial to the community. The RDCs were an emerging threat to the councilors’ status. In 1999, the council suspended further RDC elections. To resolve the crisis, PROSPECT worked with the city council and ABOs so that everyone understood their roles. Under the auspices of CARE, stakeholders worked to develop a new legal framework for RDC and council relations. Elections only resumed in mid-2002, so for almost three years, the ABO structure was not fully operational. (Some project activities continued, as the suspension only affected new elections, but the conflict cast a pall over ABO, CARE, and council relations.) The result of the suspension has been a more robust
legal framework for the ABOs, a significant step forward for scaling up CDD, integration of the ABOs into the municipal government structure, and its spread to all peri-urban compounds in Lusaka (whether CARE works in them or not).

Still, the crisis showed how politics can be a significant obstacle to CDD and scaling-up if ignored. The experience suggests politics cannot and should not be avoided. Politicians, bureaucrats, and local leaders may perceive new structures and new resources as threatening to their traditional positions or governing mechanisms. However, they may also see them as opportunities, and they may want—and deserve—some say about how resources are allocated or institutions reformed or set up. If CDD avoids or antagonizes these stakeholders, they may undermine the program. However, if the program engages them, they may be able to support it, leverage funds, influence or recruit others, or advise of future plans or pitfalls that may affect the project. Good program design that stresses communication and engagement of key players from the beginning is crucial.

CARE’s position as an important international NGO with resources to fund the dialogue and meet some community needs possibly allowed them to play that mediating role in a way that a less prestigious or less well-funded organization could not. Scaling up CDD may thus require the prestige and resources of an outside catalytic change agent, and it almost certainly requires that stakeholder and participant roles and responsibilities are clarified from the beginning and quite possibly “officialized” in some way.

The history of PUSH II and PROSPECT also illustrates the organizational difficulty of supporting CDD. Despite PUSH II’s initial emphasis on CDD and empowerment, PROSPECT over time came to focus more on promoting specific interventions (water provision, microfinance) than on energizing CDD in a sustainable way. This is not entirely surprising, given the genuine community need for water, external evaluations that encouraged water schemes, and donors that stressed outputs over process. As a result, the focus shifted from process to specific activities of previously determined project components. PROSPECT’s own monitoring and evaluation system also focused more on outputs or their impacts, rather than on indicators
of effectiveness and sustainability of ABOs. Efforts to support CDD thus will require changes in project design and performance indicators, and in donor perspectives and expectations.

Other factors were also important in shaping CDD. Democratization and a national policy of decentralization, along with encouragement from key CARE staff, encouraged a community-based approach to development. Project management was careful to train staff in participatory methods. This was important for them to understand how to promote CDD. Project and mission management’s own insistence on decentralizing authority and empowering staff further enhanced this thrust. All this created a national and institutional environment important to promoting CDD.

Funding continues to be a severe challenge to sustainability. Neither Council nor ABOs have adequate resources to build capacity or implement projects to meet identified needs. Without resources to meet community demands, CDD becomes a hollow exercise and structures will wither.

The evolution of PROSPECT suggests that the nature of support to CDD will change over time. The promoting organization therefore must be a learning and empowering organization. Initial promotion of CDD may involve establishing local structures and working to create an enabling environment, but supporting organizations must move to build their capacity on a number of fronts, including needs identification, project design, fund-raising, and project management. As community, municipal, and national structures become stronger, the promoting organization will need to move from the center to the side. It may still be involved in strengthening organizations and shaping the enabling environment, but the skills and activities required to do this are very different from those required at the beginning, when the institutional landscape is more barren. The promoting organization itself must be ready to transform its support (activities, funding focus, and staff numbers and skills) rather than simply “shutting down” or “exiting.”

The study also finds that scaling up occurs rather naturally along a number of different dimensions over time. In PROSPECT’s case, not only were the ABOs
ultimately integrated into the social and institutional fabric of urban government in Lusaka, PROSPECT’s approach had impact beyond the project itself. Seeing a need for project learning and documentation, CARE instituted a new project, Urban INSAKA. CARE’s C3 is a relatively new project that, like the Zambian Social Investment Fund, funds community initiatives, thereby supporting CDD with responsive resources. CULP has repeated PROSPECT’s approach in three more cities in Zambia, while Mahavita has transferred the experience to Antananarivo in Madagascar. These last examples of scaling-up depended to a great extent on the international reach of CARE and key advisors who took the experiences, structures, approach, and lessons from PROSPECT and transferred them to other locations.
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1. Introduction

Since 1998, PROSPECT (Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and Community Transformation) has worked to reduce poverty in peri-urban areas of Lusaka. PROSPECT uses a community-based approach to carry out three types of activities: social empowerment (institution building at the local level), personal empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (mostly water supply schemes).

PROSPECT has attempted to carry out these activities largely through its support of area-based organizations (ABOs) that now form part of city government. The zone development committees (ZDCs) and residents’ development committees (RDCs) are the basic components of the ABO structure. They are community-level representations of municipal government: the community’s mechanisms for expressing its voice and driving development.

PROSPECT is an extension of an earlier project, PUSH II (Peri-Urban Self-Help Project). PUSH II and PROSPECT are fundamentally about developing community-based and community-driven development (CDD) mechanisms, strengthening community capacities to identify and respond to community needs. This paper examines the scaling-up experience of PUSH II and PROSPECT, looking especially at the ABOs.

The Study

The study aims to learn about scaling up from PUSH/PROSPECT experience. The key questions for this study are

- How do you promote scaling-up?
- What are the essential elements of success, and the critical challenges?

This report is not an evaluation of PROSPECT’s operations or impact; rather, issues of effectiveness and sustainability are intimately linked to issues surrounding scaling up. This is because
• We want to scale up something that is effective,
• The elements of successful operation and sustainability may influence the ability to successfully scale up, and
• Scaling-up issues may vary, depending on whether the program itself is effective.

Consequently, the study provides insights into operational effectiveness and sustainability. From the point of view of the questions above, was PROSPECT a successful, sustainable experience with scaling-up? Or was there just a mechanical replication and spreading of structures?

The independent final evaluation of PROSPECT conducted in early 2003 (Hall et al. 2003) is largely positive about PROSPECT’s impact on a wide range of indicators, although it makes three critical observations, which this study supports:

• The impact of many initiatives is poorly measured or difficult to measure (and so left unconfirmed).
• PROSPECT did not have as much impact as it might have.
• PROSPECT must be actively strategic for the remainder of the project period to sustain its impacts.

So, understood as a successful intervention, PROSPECT is a worthwhile case study. With PROSPECT apparently successfully redirecting, energizing, and integrating community-based organizations (CBOs) into the municipal governance structures of Lusaka, it is also a worthwhile study of the challenges faced by initiatives to scale up CDD.

Over a period of about three weeks in May 2003, I conducted interviews with a range of focus groups and key informants, and I reviewed proposals, reports, and other background documentation. The experience of PROSPECT is complemented by incorporation of additional information from other CARE Zambia projects (CULP, C3, Urban Insaka) and from Mahavita, an urban livelihoods program in Madagascar.

Specifically, I conducted interviews with representatives from ABOs in 8 of the
11 compounds where PROSPECT works, and in 5 areas where PROSPECT does not work; senior community development officers on the staff of the Lusaka City Council; two area councilors; four field staff (basically the more experienced half of the remaining field staff of PROSPECT’s institution building component), the program manager and assistant program manager for PROSPECT; and current and former project coordinators of other urban-based CARE programs: CULP, C3, KAR, and Urban Insaka. Some of these points also build on data collected by Jennifer Rowell, CARE/U.K.’s urban advisor.

One reason PROSPECT provides unique lessons is because of its nearly 10-year history (when considering it as an extension of PUSH II) of a community-based approach to development. It has gone through a number of phases and thus provides lessons about how such programs develop and change over time. Of greatest interest to this study, PROSPECT has gone through the process of “redirecting” and energizing the ABOs and assisting their incorporation into the social and institutional fabric of municipal governance. It is now in the process of phasing out (or scaling down). PROSPECT scales up processes as well as “hardware,” such as infrastructure.

Within PROSPECT, the ABOs (zone and resident’s development committees—or ZDCs and RDCs) are the prime representation of and the major actors in CDD, so the study focuses on them. The ZDCs are closest to the community. Along with the RDCs, they take responsibility for mobilizing residents, implementing projects at the grassroots, and listening to and taking community concerns to the RDC level for discussion and action. Community residents elect 10 members (five men and five women) for three-year terms. The RDC is a representative decisionmaking body for each compound that links residents with the municipal council. Generally, the administrative boundaries for the RDC and the area councilor are the same. Each compound thus usually has one councilor, although especially large compounds, such as George, may have more than one.

Initially, the ZDCs and the RDCs were linked by a forum of zone representatives (FZR), but this was abolished after a political conflict arose between the municipal council and the ABOs in 2000 (see Figure 1). Other elements may have supported or
emerged from these ABOs (for example, water boards are a new facet of community-based management), but ABOs remain the key element.

Figure 1—Structure of area-based organizations (ABOs)

Source: Revised from Bopp and Bopp (2001) and Hedley (1999).
The Meaning and Context of Scaling Up

In simplified schematic terms, for CDD to be effective, communities must have the capacity to carry out development-related activities and make demands on service providers, primarily government authorities. Government must have the willingness and capacity to respond. Effective mechanisms to link community and government must operate in a conducive, enabling environment. In essence, there must be the ability of the community to “demand” development and the government to work to “supply” it.

CDD does not mean that the community takes on full responsibility for all development activities in the area—it does not have to provide all human, financial, or technical resources. Nor does it mean that the catalyst for action has to come from the community, or that the program itself has to originate there. It means that the community participates meaningfully in—and fundamentally drives—the decisions about development that affect it. And this means that the community has the capacity to gain access to, build, and profit from the human, financial, and technical resources mentioned above.

Some sort of community organization must exist to drive development, but this does not mean that their only form must be as nongovernmental, community-bounded associations. A variety of organizational structures can undertake CDD, including, as in this study, organizations that ultimately form part of the local government.

Scaling up a project beyond the confines of a community requires flexibility and ability to adapt to new local conditions (to different local environment). Scaling-up also begins an interaction with the larger environment, one that is not necessary when CDD works only within the boundaries of a community. CDD therefore requires a different strategic effort than just repeating a project in another bounded area.

This paper examines the following:

- the context of CDD in Lusaka,
- the origins of PROSPECT,
- evolution of PROSPECT, including its dimensions of scaling up,
• the development of ABOs,
• factors that have constrained and encouraged PROSPECT’s scaling up of CDD,
• lessons for scaling-up processes of CDD.

2. The National Context and Community-Driven Development

Zambia has experimented with community participation for development in urban unplanned settlements since at least the Second National Development Plan in 1972. At that point, the government made a decision to upgrade—rather than demolish—squatter settlements, which were usually illegal and located in peri-urban areas on the fringes of cities. Early efforts to create infrastructure for basic services in these areas were largely unsuccessful. The city council simply did not have the funds to manage or maintain services, and settlement residents had limited participation in planning and managing infrastructure. Consequently, they had little stake in protecting, using, and maintaining the services (Hedley 1998).

These constraints continued to limit provision of urban services until Zambia’s return to multiparty democracy in 1991. With democratization came an emphasis on greater participation and on decentralization of planning and decisionmaking. This required strengthening local government and fostering a more enabling environment for CDD.

As part of these initiatives, in 1992, the Lusaka City Council (LCC) passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a CBO in low-income settlements to spearhead development. Only in 1994 did the LCC formally order the establishment of RDCs in all peri-urban settlements, or compounds, of Lusaka. The RDCs replaced the previous ward development committees that had been established during the Second Republic (1972–91). The ward development committees represented very large areas (sometimes four or five settlements), functioned primarily as extensions of the ruling political party, and tended to work without close consultation with either the LCC or local residents. The
RDCs would serve as the new compound-wide mechanism for community participation in planning and development (Hedley 1998).

In an interesting play of factors, the drive for decentralization and participation threw light on the situation of illegal peri-urban settlements. Seen initially as temporary, government had largely ignored them. Years later, they were still there and clearly were not going to disappear. But how to provide them with services when they had no legal standing or representation in urban government? The municipal government began to legalize these areas and allow the establishment of an RDC and representation in city government through an area councilor. The problem of lack of resources, however, persisted, and city government remained largely unable to provide services.

The opening of the political system to democratic competition during the Third Republic (1991 to present) was a positive development, but the transition to genuine political competition and accountability was not immediate and remains incomplete. The competencies of community, municipal, and national authorities are still being worked out. The broad outlines of the national government’s decentralization policy has been known for almost 10 years, but the policy paper was published only recently. In the meantime, policies generally recognized the government’s inability to pay for services and supported the concept of CBOs playing implementation and even limited policy roles (Hedley 1999, GKCr).¹

The national government has set up decisionmaking bodies, the Development Coordinating Committees, to coordinate programs and policies at the national, provincial, and district level (Lusaka is one district), but they remain largely inactive (Hedley 1999, GKCr, RC). The Ministry of Health has developed district health boards and established neighborhood health committees. Donors have worked with various levels of government to support decentralization, including a UNCHS/Danida-funded training program of the Ministry of Local Government, the Sustainable Lusaka Program that

¹ Interviews with focus groups and key informants are referenced by letters. GKCr, for example, is for the joint session held with RDC members (r) from George, Kanyama, and Chipata compounds (GKC). See the Annex for more detail.
operated with UNEP/UNCHS support, and Irish Aid’s Program of Community Managed Urban Services (Hedley 1999).

The national government still exerts a great deal of control over municipal actions and has sometimes thwarted efforts at decentralization and democratization. For instance, the Third Republic introduced elections of city councilors. Councilors then were to select a mayor or town clerk. As of 1999, however, the LCC still had limited powers and responded largely to and relied on resources from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. The ministry even suspended the council and clerk and appointed a Local Government Administrator for Lusaka for almost two years (Hedley 1999).

3. CARE’s Involvement

PUSH I

The economic recovery strategy initiated in 1989 aimed to stabilize and restructure the economy. By removing subsidies and price controls on basic commodities, including the staple maize meal, prices rose, increasing the hardship of the urban poor. At the same time, conditions in the squatter settlements, or compounds, were worsening, with accumulation of garbage, blocked or nonexistent drainage systems, distant or contaminated water sources, and few latrines (Alston et al. 1993).

PUSH (1991–94) was a food-for-work (FFW) program that began as an initiative of the Program Against Malnutrition (PAM). PAM was a Government of Zambia and a World Food Programme (WFP) effort intended to alleviate the negative effects of structural adjustment and stabilization and the 1991–92 drought on well-being and food security (DfID 1998).

PUSH was a “quick action” program that targeted the urban food-insecure; the idea was that relief would reduce the likelihood of urban unrest (DfID 1998). At WFP’s request, CARE implemented PUSH in three of the largest of Lusaka’s then-33 compounds: Chipata (about 120,000 residents), George (about 150,000), and Kanyama
(50,000–100,000). WFP would be the lead donor, providing US$1.5 million in foodstuffs, while the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) agreed to provide C$1.5 million for Canadian and local costs. In these compounds, PUSH benefited 2,000 participants, mainly women, who contributed labor to building roads and drainage systems and clearing garbage (CARE/Zambia, no date[a]).

Phase I of PUSH was clearly driven from the top. It was, after all, a response to economic crisis, with the nature of assistance largely mapped out by donors and the national government. PUSH I was not intended to be a community-development project. As it evolved, however, CARE found itself responding to a wider range of needs than initially envisioned. For instance, 95 percent of the workers in Lusaka were women. Responding to worker demand and need, CARE helped establish preschools (Alston et al. 1993).

The expansion of project activities beyond FFW led CARE into greater community involvement and, by implication, into community development. CARE wanted a community-based partner and began to work with the LCC to support the creation or reestablishment of RDCs in the compounds where it operated. These early RDCs were often formed through the participation of a limited number of local residents. By 1995, the need for broader-based participation was apparent, and the ABO structure was further elaborated. The idea of zone representatives, as units beneath the RDC, was being pioneered in Kamanga compound under an Irish Aid upgrading project (Hedley 1998) and had already been suggested by an ODA review team.

**PUSH II**

In the second phase of PUSH, PUSH II (1994–97), CARE sought to move from direct implementation to facilitating implementation and building the capacity of the community to identify and act on development needs (CARE Zambia, no date [a]). Despite the name, it was hardly a second phase: it worked in the same three compounds
(Chipata, George, and Kanyama) but otherwise was very different. It turned out to be, in fact, the direct precursor and pilot of PROSPECT.

PUSH II phased out the FFW program and structured activities around the three concepts and activity sets mentioned earlier: social empowerment (ABOs), personal empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (water supply). Empowerment of beneficiaries and communities to drive development was PUSH II’s guiding principle.

PUSH II established an ABO structure in each compound with three levels: the zone development committees (ZDCs), a forum of zone representatives (FZR), and a residents’ development committee (RDC). The FZR was to facilitate exchange and debate between the ZDC and the RDC on zonal issues. The RDC was to provide compound-wide coordination and deal with development issues or take them up with the city council. PUSH II trained these area-based representatives in leadership skills, community mobilization, and project management.

**PROSPECT**

PROSPECT (1998–2004) scaled up PUSH II from these 3 compounds to 11 in Lusaka, raising the number of beneficiary residents to about 600,000. PROSPECT essentially maintained PUSH II’s focus and approach, only without FFW. Over time, PROSPECT continued learning and refining its components. It increased the size of the microfinance group, originally an average of 4–5 members, so that each individual could obtain a greater amount of self-raised capital. It encouraged the formation of a cooperative among the groups. A water trust incorporating service providers and community representatives was established to ensure effective, sustainable water management. The water payment system was refined to allow individuals to “pay as they go.” Environmental health emerged as a significant new activity, as did work on HIV/AIDS and gender. And after a serious political conflict between the RDCs and the
city council, the FZR was eliminated, resulting in a two-tier ABO composed of only ZDCs and an RDC in each compound.

4. Development of the Area-Based Organizations (ABOs)

The ABOs are supposed to be the voice of the community—the structures driving community development. As such, they merit special attention and are the focus of this paper in terms of learning lessons about scaling-up. As noted, the RDCs emerged from existing political structures, either as reformulations of the ward development committees or as new structures established by the city council.

In 1994, LCC and PUSH I formed a steering committee to draft a constitution for the RDCs. The original mandate of the RDCs was inclusive. RDCs were to act to

- improve market facilities, roads, drainage, water, sanitation, and garbage;
- improve shelter, recreation amenities, public health, and education;
- promote economic and cultural activities and other developments;
- manage human and financial resources as necessary to develop community plans;
- ensure that women and men of all levels could receive leadership and business training;
- engage residents to express their needs and effectively implement, monitor, evaluate, and maintain committee projects;
- promote communication about needs and potential means of meeting them among local residents and outside authorities and agents;
- coordinate the work of these residents and agents;
- promote relevant research;
- provide information and advisory services to committee members as needed; and
- further the objectives of the committee.
RDC members were elected for three-year terms. All settlement residents age 18 and older could vote. No one who held office in a political party was eligible to run. The city council had the RDCs register in the Registrar of Societies, essentially a CBO, not a government body, in order to reinforce their nonpartisan nature and to allow them to own and manage assets, such as property and services.

The area councilor served as an ex-officio member of the RDC, but the constitution did not otherwise spell out the relationship between the RDC and councilor or the City Council. It only stated that the councilor was the primary channel of communication with the City Council, and that, otherwise, the RDC should communicate with the municipality’s Peri-Urban Section of the Housing and Social Services Department.

Importantly, as shown by its initial dealings with the LCC under PUSH I, CARE seems to have recognized the importance of getting government acquiescence to the establishment of these structures, but then it largely worked with them at the margin of government. They were seen primarily as a community-based structure, a CBO, with which CARE could engage and implement project activities, particularly water and finance, not as part of government. As such, they appear to have existed fairly autonomously from other CBOs or NGOs in the community. At the same time, they were set up with close ties with the municipal government and essentially stated they had responsibility over (not just an interest in) practically all aspects of community development.

When an RDC’s term of office ended, the city council could appoint trustees to serve as caretakers until a new RDC could be elected. This would allow development to proceed without interruption while new elections were being organized. The original ABO system did not anticipate this feature, but it would play a major role during the crisis.

In 2002 and 2003, PROSPECT assisted with ABO reelectons under the revised ABO constitution and model. It has formed and trained 4,400 ABO members and 60
community facilitators. Ten of these are now facilitators themselves. It is piloting compound-wide coordination mechanisms in four compounds (Chimansa 2003).

5. Project Evolution and Community-Driven Development

The Shift to Community-Driven Development

PUSH I was a traditional top-down development project, but the focus of PUSH II shifted to empowerment and CDD. Working within a national environment that was encouraging democracy and decentralization, two other factors contributed to this shift: an ODA appraisal and the training and philosophy of key CARE staff.

As the PUSH project came to an end, CARE began searching for funds to continue. CIDA, the Canadian development agency that had funded PUSH, had made a decision not to fund projects in Lusaka any more. In response, CARE requested funds for a project extension from ODA, and in September 1993, an ODA appraisal team came to Zambia to evaluate CARE’s proposal.

This mission set the future direction for PUSH and PROSPECT. The mission emphasized that the FFW scheme was not an effective safety net for urban residents for a number of reasons: it had only reached a small proportion of the needy population; it was not targeted to those at highest risk of malnutrition; and it made no contribution to the long-term capacity of participants to improve their livelihoods or the ability of the community to sustain the improved infrastructure and services (Alston et al. 1993).

The mission then suggested that the project “extension” should shift from FFW to community development. It emphasized developing capacities of community residents and leaders and consistently noted the need for community participation in the design and implementation of the carry-on project. Of signature importance was the fact that the mission did not specify which activities the project extension should undertake. In fact, the mission explicitly stated that the determination of project activities should mostly take place only after funding was secured and after completing a baseline and other initial studies. This now-community development project would be, in ODA terminology the
report said, a “process project”: it would determine priorities and outputs only after the project began (Alston et al. 1993). This was the basis for genuine CDD under PUSH II, and in its focus on process and community participation, it reflected the latest in development thinking at the time (DfID 1998).

The mission also noted that the community had to have a truly representative mechanism for the community to express itself, if the project was to genuinely reflect community needs and allow for community participation and control. At the time, only a few years after the beginning of a multi-party system in Zambia, the RDCs were not accountable to the people, nor did they serve as an effective channel of communication between community and government. The RDCs were to be nonpolitical but in practice, with the phase-out of the ward development committees, they continued to function largely as party structures [CCJr, CCJz, Npr]. They had lost their clout and public support. In many compounds, even those in which CARE was working, there were no elections. RDC members were volunteers, frequently known community leaders, chosen after meetings of just 10 to 30 people often from within only a small area of the compound (DfID 1998) [Cdos].

To address these problems, the report suggested the establishment of development committees at a lower level, the zone. These two committees, the ZDCs and the RDCs, would form the basis for the ABOs that would be the cornerstone of CARE’s efforts to promote CDD.

The ODA mission also probably helped CARE avoid some pitfalls of scaling-up. CARE’s initial intention was to expand PUSH I to nine compounds. But the mission argued that PUSH I was not a pilot for PUSH II, and did not provide the necessary operational experiences to learn for PUSH II. PUSH II was different. The report said CARE should learn about conditions and processes before expanding, that CARE should continue to work in the same compounds as it had during PUSH I and truly pilot the new focus. The report also highlighted the importance of trained staff for a process project. PUSH II would require a different composition of staff, with different skills (fewer
engineers, more social development workers, for instance) (Alston et al. 1993). CARE took both of these recommendations on board.

CARE itself was also moving to a more participatory approach. CARE’s country and assistant country directors pushed for more CDD and provided a supportive environment for ODA’s recommendations. As a relatively new country office, established only in 1991, it was looking for ways to make CARE unique and appealing to donors. After internal consultations, CARE decided that a principal distinguishing feature would be not what they did, but how they did things. They decided to focus on partnerships with stakeholders. Instead of being top-down or confrontational, they would engage the communities and the government, building on and sharing experiences with decisionmakers and actors. In a fairly small office, management worked to create a team spirit and an appreciation for organizational learning. Project staff interacted with country management easily and often [RC].

The backgrounds and interest of key CARE staff also influenced the focus on participation and CDD. The Assistant Country Director who led the PUSH II redesign was a sociologist who had worked previously in rural areas of Zambia. Trained in the U.K., he was well aware of the new thinking at Sussex and elsewhere about participatory development and a more holistic approach to poverty through understanding livelihood strategies. ODA’s recommendations reinforced his own push for community participation and community-based development within CARE [RC, MD].

In the end, PUSH II challenged conventional thinking about project design, which tended to have specific, pre-determined components, inputs and anticipated outcomes. PUSH II emphasized learning along with the community. This approach was particularly appropriate, given the heterogeneity and complexity of urban needs and conditions, and of CARE’s lack of knowledge about urban conditions and of urban project experience (DfID 1998). That in practice PUSH and PROSPECT largely fell back to promoting specific interventions such as water supply is a testimony to the difficulties in implementing and sustaining such an approach. Nevertheless, the experience does provide some insights into structures and capacities needed to support such an approach.
Carrying Out Community-Driven Development

CARE’s approach to CDD involved enabling the community to identify and respond to needs. Community empowerment started when CARE entered the community, as PUSH II and PROSPECT incorporated community residents into the initial rapid needs and institutional assessment. The two introductory steps integrated a rapid needs appraisal with the formation or re-energizing of the ABOs (CARE Zambia, no date [b]; Barton et al. 1997).

- Part 1—Surveillance and Rapid Appraisal—established an implementation team, including city council staff and the area Councilor, to undertake initial studies. The team introduced the project to compound leaders, such as the RDC members if already established, businesspeople, and church leaders; did a rapid assessment of institutions operating in the area; and demarcated administrative zones within the compound.

- Part 2—PANA II and ABO Formation—included a more in-depth assessment of the problems, capacities, and opportunities for change in the community. With local community leaders and residents, CARE led a PANA, or Participatory Appraisal and Needs Assessment, at the zone level. This more thorough assessment reconfirmed and deepened the analysis of the issues uncovered in the rapid appraisal, and identified any area-specific issues. The team sponsored the election of a zone development committee and was supposed to formulate an action plan to respond to the identified community needs.

PANAs in the three compounds of Chipata, George, and Kanyama confirmed that water was a serious need in all areas. CARE recognized that to be sustainable, the water supply would need a community-based management structure and it would need to generate sufficient revenues to cover costs. The poorest would need to be able to earn enough income to pay for the water. In this way, the three components of PUSH II came together: Institution Building (IB), which focused on establishing effective, functioning
ABOs; Infrastructure Improvement (II), which helped construct a water system, including tap stands; and Microfinance (MF), primarily for women, which established self-managed savings and loans groups based on the traditional savings system, chilimba.

PUSH II intended to carry out these activities sequentially. To ensure community ownership and input, the IB component would begin first. Staff would make initial contacts, demarcate zones, hold elections if necessary, and then conduct the PANA. The process took time and had to be repeated in every zone. With 10 to 20 zones, this could take months, and the communities who had completed the process became impatient. On the other hand, construction firms were contracted on a certain time schedule and were ready to work, regardless of whether the ABO was fully formed or not [Prs]. In practice, the II often began before the ABO and the PANA were complete. Staff say this is because the IB component was inherently political and also relied more on developing community relations [Prs].

PUSH focused initial attention on developing the ABOs. By building on existing structures, CARE enhanced sustainability (the structures already responded to some expressed need and were part of the community and municipal structure), but they also encountered distortions. For example, although the RDCs were supposed to be representative and apolitical, previous members of the RDC with political affiliations were allowed to run for office again. Conflict sometimes emerged when the demarcation lines threw more than one set of members of the RDCs into electoral competition [Prs].

6. Building and Scaling Up Processes and Institutions

PUSH II scaled up as PROSPECT. The idea was to continue work in the three initial compounds and expand to nine more over five years. By 2003, then, PROSPECT should have been working in 12 of the 39 peri-urban compounds in Lusaka. The composition and number changed over time, as circumstances changed in the compounds or compounds were not legalized, excluding them from consideration.
PROSPECT had begun work in three additional compounds by 2000: Jack (1998), Chaisa (1999), and Chibolya (2000). But then, as a result of a political dispute, the city council suspended further RDC elections. Although some activities continued to go forward, the election and redirection of the ABOs—the scaling-up that is the focus of this paper—stopped. The stakeholders, including CARE, the city council, and the RDCs, reached a resolution in 2002, and elections began again. PROSPECT now works in five other compounds (Chuunga, Kabanana, Chazanga, Mtendere, and Garden), bringing the total number of “expansion compounds” to eight. Some of these held elections only in 2004. This experience highlights the challenges of scaling up CDD.

Dimensions of Scaling-Up

Activities that increase a program’s impact are not by themselves scaling-up; a dimension of growth or progression must accompany change and transformation. PUSH II/PROSPECT scaled up along multiple dimensions (see Table 1). The experience suggests that such transformations are organic aspects of programs that promote CDD.

PROSPECT scaled up “internally,” that is, in ways that relate specifically project operations, by

- entering new compounds,
- incorporating new activities,
- working beyond the RDC down to the zone level and up to the level of the city council and the national government, and
- building managerial and community capacity to undertake activities.

PROSEPCt scaled up “externally” that is, in ways that affected the operations of other programs and organizations, by

- seeing the city council establish and support ABOs in other compounds where PROSPECT did not work,
integrating the ABO structure into municipal governance,
• influencing national and city council policy (sitting on committees, etc.), and
• catalyzing other efforts, as offshoots or support for PROSPECT (Urban Insaka, C3) or separate projects (CULP in other Zambian cities, Mahavita in Antananarivo, Madagascar).

Thus, PROSPECT represented a scaling-up of PUSH II quantitatively, functionally, organizationally, and politically (Table 1). Most important for this study, PROSPECT is an instance where a donor (DfID) and an operational organization (CARE) scaled up CDD in ways that it became integrated into national and municipal structures. This has then allowed for widespread “replication” of CDD.

The Impact of Scaling-Up

PROSPECT may have scaled up, but has it scaled up successfully? A recent review (Hall et al. 2003) says yes. The review argues that the ABOs in compounds where PROSPECT has worked are, in general, better able to articulate the interests of residents. Partly this is a result of PROSPECT staff’s conducting (usually one-off) trainings in governance, leadership, and management.

PROSPECT is, within limits noted earlier, an illustration of successful scaling-up in that government has incorporated and spread structures of CDD. In its lifetime, PROSPECT has influenced the thinking and actions of government and civil society organizations and of international donor agencies and organizations. Public authorities are more aware of the needs and potentials of poor urban residents. The city council now formally recognizes the ABOs and has adopted the ABO structure as part of city government, spreading them to another 24 or so compounds outside PROSPECT areas. Many councilors actively support the idea of the ABOs, and council staff works to strengthen them as well, to the extent possible, given limited resources. Many ABOs have established working relationships with other agencies and international donors, such
Table 1: Dimensions of PUSH/PROSPECT’s scaling-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative scaling-up (or scaling-out)</th>
<th>PUSH/PROSPECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spread</strong></td>
<td>ABOs established with new structure in 36 of 39 peri-urban compounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expansion of activities of ABOs in their own compounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Replication</strong></td>
<td>ABOs redirected in three compounds and now replicated in eight8 more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nurture</strong></td>
<td>Directs ABOs to funding sources, including C3 and ZAMSIF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td>LCC supports establishment of ABOs with new constitution, replication in peri-urban areas, use of council staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional scaling-up</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental health, gender, and HIV/ AIDS components added</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PROSPECT links with KAR (urban waste management program) to mobilize communities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ABOs constructed clinics and police posts and community centers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal</strong></td>
<td>enhancing government verticalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>planning to focus on ZDC capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>suggesting creation of federation of ABOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>creating capacity and support among council staff and councilors sitting on national development coordinating committee (NDCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vertical</strong></td>
<td><strong>PROSPECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>governance (Bopp) study and reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>member of NDCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intimately linked with council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>promotion of federated ABO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political scaling-up</strong></td>
<td><strong>PUSH I (FFW to build infrastructure)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation</strong></td>
<td><strong>PUSH II/PROSPECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>redirection of ABOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>water management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second generation</strong></td>
<td><strong>PROSPECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>governance (Bopp) study and reforms</td>
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<td>member of NDCC</td>
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<td>intimately linked with council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>promotion of federated ABO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third</strong></td>
<td><strong>PROSPECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABOs legal change from civil society to government structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>some RDC members have become councilors</td>
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<td><strong>Fourth</strong></td>
<td><strong>PROSPECT</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>ABOs legal change from civil society to government structure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>some RDC members have become councilors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational scaling-up</strong></td>
<td><strong>cross-training and cross-sectoral coordination of CARE staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal management</strong></td>
<td><strong>training of ABOs and LCC members, council staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial viability</strong></td>
<td>connecting ABOs to water schemes for revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assisting with finding donors, writing proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional diversification</strong></td>
<td><strong>spin-offs and incorporation of RDC in other structures (water scheme board, microfinance board)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>external influence, with LCC, international presentations, Mahavita</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>internal influence, with UI, CULP, C3, KAR</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
as Ireland Aid and the Zambian Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), to raise funds and implement development projects to benefit the wider community (Hall et al. 2003). Staff sit on national and municipal policymaking committees.

7. Challenges to Scaling-Up: Facilitating and Constraining Factors

But, according to the review, PROSPECT’s influence and impact have been more limited than expected. The key challenges to successful, sustainable scaling-up seem to have been political and organizational. The spread of the RDCs threatened the authority of the city councilors, and in 1999, they moved to suspend further RDC elections. The lifting of the suspension resulted in a more robust legal framework for the ABOs, but the crisis created a significant obstacle to scaling up CDD. Additionally, the history of PUSH II and PROSPECT illustrates the organizational difficulty of supporting CDD. Despite PUSH II’s initial emphasis on CDD and empowerment, PROSPECT came to focus more on promoting specific interventions (water provision, microfinance) than on strengthening ABOs and energizing their relations with the LCC and the national government in a sustainable way.

Other factors include

- availability of resources;
- capacities of the facilitating, implementing, and monitoring organizations;
- institutional arrangements and political complications; and
- performance monitoring and incentive systems.

This study does not intend to repeat information on operations or impact readily available in internal and external reviews and reports, but it discusses this information, in addition to newly collected data, from the point of view of scaling-up.
Political Challenges

During the late 1990s, some councilors felt the ABOs were undermining their authority and status and compromising the democratic process (Hall et al. 2003). This mistrust had to do with historical, institutional, and financial factors. Traditionally, the councilor was in charge of development activities in each settlement. Historically, the institutional precedent for the RDC was the ward development committee, a politicized body that often functioned at the behest of the councilor. “[They] were trying to solve some of the problems of the settlements,” said one RDC member [CCJr], “but they were heavily politicized, because the council was being partisan and looked after only their own problems. And community problems were not attended to. And if there was money coming in, they were the only ones who knew, the cadres.”

However, the ABOs that replaced them were different. Now the ABOs, nonpartisan bodies, were charged with promoting and coordinating development in the community. The councilor was not even given a meaningful vote on the RDC, but served ex officio. This was immediately at odds with usual government structures. Councilors had experience mostly with party and national government structures, which functioned in a top-down way, and councilors did not understand very well how these structures were supposed to work.

While, potentially, the ABOs could continue to function as extensions of the political party (in some cases they did), as key players in PUSH II and PROSPECT, the RDCs also managed significant development resources. Because the RDCs helped to mobilize, design, and implement water and microfinance projects, RDC members became common faces in the community. Community residents, long wary of the ineffectiveness and bias of the councilors, now saw the concrete fruits of their labors (labor on projects was voluntary), and they could see how the RDC benefited the community. ABOs were rivaling and sometimes eclipsing councilors in influence and access to donors (Hall et al. 2003) [CCJr].
Conflict arose between councilors and the RDCs as councilors began to see them as a threat to their traditional position. Unfortunately, the ABO constitution did not clearly spell out the relationship between councilor and the RDC in a way that could resolve the issue. In addition, RDCs were registered under the Societies Act, giving them status as a CBO. Effectively, however, they were serving as a part of government, but without legal authority.

Said one RDC chairman:

We had all the support we needed from the council officials, but not from the councilor. From 1991, the MMD [Movement for Multiparty Democracy party] came into power. They were the majority. Now with the coming of the RDC concept, to them it was like we were in opposition to them because we were working with NGOs directly, our projects were funded directly, and they were successful projects. Whereas with the council, there was no money. Their programs could not proceed. And so they now saw us as a challenge to the ruling party. And now they had problems with the council officials, accusing them of siding with the RDCs more instead of with the councilors. And this led to the suspension of the constitution, because the councilors wanted to form a part, and have a say, and name their own cadres. Now with the coming of the opposition, the last elections [2001], there is no MMD in Lusaka. And we have teamed up with the opposition very well. So the problem was not with the council officials, but with the councilors [CCJr].

The situation came to a head in late 1999, when the council voted to suspend further elections of RDCs (Hall et al. 2003). CARE was taken aback by this development but began to work with major stakeholders and Urban INSAKA to find a solution. An outside team of consultants with expertise in municipal governance, commissioned by CARE, undertook a month-long participatory review. They formed study teams of most stakeholders, including RDC members, councilors, PROSPECT, and other CARE staff. They gathered and discussed a wide range of perspectives on the council-ABO relationship and on the ABO’s status as an entity of civil society or of government (Hall et al. 2003; Bopp and Bopp 2001) [RC].
The suspension of new elections lasted almost three years. New elections were held in late 2002 and 2003. This action did not bring all ABO activity to a halt. In the compounds that already had RDCs, for instance, activities kept going as normal because no new elections were called during the period [CCJr; CCJz]. PROSPECT continued to work in these initial compounds, but could not expand its work on ABOs beyond them. This episode showed the political sensitivity of CDD and cast serious doubt on the wisdom of PROSPECT’s approach, which until then had largely tried to avoid involvement with government.

The internal structure within the ABO was also a source of problems. The FZR was to connect the ZDC and the RDC. But it met infrequently and, according to residents, did not filter problems down to the ZDC. As a result, the ZDC became increasingly ineffective. The grassroots “eyes and ears” quit seeing and hearing [CCJr].

Changes instituted after the consultation clarified the relationships. It was agreed that

- ABOs were voluntary nonpartisan development agencies established by the LCC.
- ABOs were part of the local government system and should be registered under the Local Government Act, not the Societies Act.
- The Council would delegate authority to the ABOs, and the ABOs would work in partnership with the Council.
- The Council would not interfere with the operation of the ABOs, but could intervene according to certain guidelines if the ABOs did not follow clearly defined rules.
- ABOs would have a two-tiered structure with 10 members elected to each ZDC (five men and five women). ZDC representatives would elect one representative to the RDC.
- ZDCs should meet with residents every quarter; RDCs, twice a year. The RDC should make five-year community development plans, as well as annual working plans in consultation with councilors, residents, and other actors.
The most significant changes were the legal incorporation of the ABOs into the local government structure; the restructuring of the ABO with the elimination of the FZR; and clarification of roles and the education of stakeholders about rights and responsibilities.

**Change in Legal Status**

Becoming an official part of the local government has advantages and disadvantages. Although the Societies Act did not give councilors any formal control over the RDCs, the history of the institution and the councilors’ positions as ex officio members meant that councilors often tried to exert control. As one RDC member described it,

> The RDC was previously registered under the Societies Act. The previous government wanted to dissolve the RDC, and we were protected, a safeguard, they had no power. All they were interested [in was] to dissolve the RDC. They dissolved only one or two, only to be warned by council officials that they had no power [CCJr].

But this arrangement was confusing, with councilors as members of the RDC, and ABOs in charge of coordinating community development without any statutory authority. The “protection” was legal but minimal. With no official connection to local government, but with independent sources of funds and “responsibility” for community development, the RDCs were emerging as potential threats to the councilors’ position.

Paradoxically, by making the ABOs the lowest tier of local government, most members feel the position and authority is much clearer and more secure. The institutionalization of the ABOs as part of government provides them with a stability, continuity, and authority not possible as a CBO. Councilors now understand that the RDCs are legitimate organs of government that they must work with, they are legal structures—not just “clubs,” and they are not going away [GKCr]. “So whatever we are doing, we have the blessing of the LCC. So we are a small government at a very low level” [CCJr]. “Even if the opposition is a bit here and there, 99 percent of them have
accepted” the RDC concept, said one RDC chairperson” [CCJr]. Coordination and communication have improved. “It is a good thing [to be registered under the Local Government Act] because now the RDC is talking directly to the government, the LCC, [and] the local government, about the problems” [CCJr].

Legally, they have had to give up their rights to assets provided by projects, which they were entitled to as CBOs. They felt the fact that the assets now belonged to “the government,” meaning the LCC, rather than to the RDC. They felt that this was not a hindrance but assisted continuity. “The assets will now be protected by the government,” they said, and, besides, “These buildings are ours” [CCJr]. So the arrangement seems to be working well, with local authorities exerting de facto control and use over the assets just as they should as part of local government.

Some members note, however, the frailty of the arrangements: “When we were there under the Societies Act, we had enough protection. At that time, the councilor could not come and dissolve the RDC. Now under the local government, the councilor can wake up and say this dissolve this” [CCJz]. The suspension of RDCs elections belies his argument, but technically the LCC could still act to eliminate the RDCs. Most do not feel that this will happen, and urge the formation of a federation to strengthen the ABO even more so “we we’ll have one voice” [CCJr].

“We intend to form a federated body of all the RDCs. The whole idea is we want our voice to be a big one, so we can even lobby for development” [CCJr]. Members claim that the RDCs know their position and rights, and are prepared to go to court to fend off any attempts to dissolve them. “As we are today, if we happened to have a new crop of councilors who are arrogant, they could easily push us out. But if we have a federation, then it will become firm and a hard thing for them to break. The big federation will take the cases to court and will have representation, and for them to target all 33 compounds, it will be very difficult” [CCJr].
Understanding of Reforms and Roles

The roles of the ZDC and the RDC are now quite clear to most members. Even at the ZDC level, most could recite the roles and responsibilities of each:

- “The ZDC is to look at the projects at the zone level, and then whatever problem they want, they forward to the RDC and the RDC should go further to look for donors” [CCJz].
- “The RDC is the mother body.” “The RDCs receive problems from the community. The RDC informs the council at the same time it begins to look for funds” [GKCr].
- “The ZDC is between the RDC. It takes messages from the RDC to the residents and again it picks information. [For example] maybe the community, the residents, see a need of a project which needs to be done…maybe a bridge, a school. The residents will take the message to the ZDC and will report to the RDC” [GKCz].

With the elimination of the FZR, communications between the ZDC and the RDC have improved. Because ZDCs select an individual from among themselves to serve on the RDC, they feel they are well informed. One group reported no problems or conflicts, even when pressed [GKCz], and members of the other focus group said:

- “Even though I am not on the RDC, I feel like I am there because all my needs are heard in the RDC. They do respond if you have [conflicts]. They do come in and give advice to the ZDC” [CCJz].
- “The relationship between the RDC and the ZDC is very cordial. Members who are on the RDC have been elected from the ZDC so the problems [are discussed]” [CCJz].
Some members seemed perturbed by questions about how well the ZDC and RDC worked together, and whether the structure actually allowed demands to bubble up from the community and the ZDC. Summarizing, the respondent said: “Don’t separate them. Only the name separates them. In the actual fact, when they go back in the evening, they are the ZDC” [CCJz].

Politics, Participation, and a Deepening of Democracy

Politics, of course, still plays a part, but the new structure brings continuity and stability and gives more effective voice to the grassroots. There is greater perspective and understanding of roles and responsibilities. Focus group participants and key informants attribute this to the ABO consultation, and continuing education to new councilors and ABO members on their rights and responsibilities. The ABO constitution is a key document in this regard, one that guides and protects day-to-day activities.

The institutional arrangements allow councilors to participate in development but also for the RDCs to manage resources. “We used to think of politicians as the custodians of development, but unfortunately they were politicizing...They look [after] their own interest,” noted one RDC member [CCJr]. They benefit only their members and not the community as a whole. If they are in the council, they are only interested in careers and elections. They are with you for one year, and then for two years they are campaigning. With the new set up, the RDCs are in the forefront because we know every bit of resource that is coming to the compound, and we are planning with the councilors. And we are very successful, and the only best way development can be brought to the community [CCJr].

Past accomplishments have energized the communities as well. “The residents come to the ZDC, and meeting and discuss and keep on pounding. Now the ZDC and the RDC are energized,” said one RDC chairman.

“Now there is a real jostling for power. When we started, there was less enthusiasm, because they have not seen what is ahead. They see there is water, construction here, drainage going on. Now they see they can get
benefits. They see if construction is going on, money is there, and so they can benefit. And also they see there are jobs for us to participate” [CCJr].

Community residents are recognizing the role of the RDC in community development and holding them accountable. “We had a number of programs that we had not accomplished by the end of the first program, and the community is coming back to find out: When are you bringing the clinic?” [CCJr]. Clearly, community residents work because they believe they may receive some benefit. But this is not necessarily negative. Residents are also seeing improvements in their compound, want to be a part of them, and appear to be holding the RDC accountable.

Hall et al. (2003) note that participation is not as widespread as desirable and that the “elites” of the community may have captured the RDC. While, initially, the less poor are more likely to participate in ABOs, the poorer eventually join them. Still, many former ABO members have progressed to political roles as elected councilors. “Conceivably,” they write, “this was inevitable, and perhaps not undesirable if, through their engagement with PROSPECT, these empowered individuals have a better understanding of the needs and interests of compound residents.”

Indeed, if elections are free and fair, and information on candidates’ backgrounds and positions widely available, then it is hard to see the drawbacks. Those chosen for the RDC probably are “elites,” but they are leaders with skills, education, or business acumen. They would be, in fact, the most appropriate candidates for the position. Why should community residents not look to these people for leadership? As long the elections hold them accountable, the fact that they are “elite” seems to be a benefit. But Hall et al. (2003) specifically worry about CARE’s insistence that the ABOs be apolitical:

More worryingly, however, it is possible that PROSPECT’s dedication to ensuring that ABOs are apolitical development-oriented institutions has actually undermined the development of democracy in Zambia. Increasingly, it is argued that enforcing a separation between development and politics, though essential for [international NGOs] whose status
depends on their distance from politics, has been detrimental to democratization and governance improvements that are said to underpin sustainable development. In the compounds of Lusaka, ten years after the political process was released from one-party rule, few people claim to respect the integrity of their elected councilors. Arguably, if residents had had reason and evidence to hold councilors accountable, even partially, for the allocation and spending of development funds (whatever the source of these funds), perhaps these councilors would have become more responsible, trustworthy, and better equipped to represent public rather than personal interest. Instead, PROSPECT’s approach and the weight of its considerable financial muscle has prevented this opportunity for local democratization.

Hall et al. (2003) provide no field-based evidence for this criticism. In fact, their comments suggest an opposite conclusion: that the heavily politicized environment itself is responsible for undermining progress, and that an international NGO that brings resources and expertise is one of the few organizations that can engage with politicians and improve governance. It is hard to see that further politicization will help unless there is fundamental redirection of the electoral process and a deeper understanding and acceptance of a competitive multiparty political system. Unless there is deepening democratization, further politicization can only be counterproductive.

Democratic mechanisms do appear to be taking hold. Residents have held councilors accountable. They have participated in elections and thrown out certain parties. They are now electing councilors after having observed them operate on behalf of the community when they served on the RDCs. One estimate is that close to half of RDC chairpersons progressed to become city councilors (Hall et al. 2003). This leads to a closer link between RDC and council, and a better understanding by the councilor of the role of the RDC and its relationships and usefulness to the councilor.

Overall, the comments also do not reflect the responses received from the various focus groups interviewed in this study. Although some respondents recognized the inherent political nature of the councilors (it could be argued this is a positive recognition), many also praised the assistance of their councilor and his attendance at RDC meetings. They also stated that the apolitical nature of the ABOs was a benefit, that
it distinguished them from the “political” structure in that they were concerned with community development rather than personal interest or “politics.” “If money was given to the politicians, the boreholes would not have been given. They realize that the development can only come through the RDC, and even the council now is giving support” [Npr]. One participant was even antagonistic toward the introduction of politics in the ABOs. “The ZDC,” he said, “is under the council, and the council is politicians. You find there are some underground chairmen” [CCJz]. So some political connections do exist. Whether they are beneficial is an empirical question.

For instance, though multiparty politics has brought a degree of healthy competition and accountability, cooperation across party lines is still an obstacle. If party affiliations are forced at the lower level as well, party lines may become fault lines. As it stands, the “apolitical” ABOs have a mandate to work with whichever parties are in power in the compound or at the municipal and national levels. For instance, councilors said that one problem they face is that they rely on the national government for funding, but the ministry does not like to fund their initiatives because the councilors belong to the opposition [Cnllr]. In one focus group, participants complained that they cannot easily dispose of market trash because the people who are in charge of the designated area “are [members of the] MMD, and so they say you are working with the council [whose members all belong to opposition parties], and so we cannot work with you, we cannot give you space” [CCJz].

Experiences in other countries suggest that these lowest local government structures, in fact, do operate without the heavy overlay of party politics, that they are concerned more with community, not national issues that may rive civil society. As already noted, however, party affiliations at higher levels can affect resource distribution. This does not then argue for further politicization but for depolitization and professionalization of government service and budget decisions. While the civil service is being strengthened, donors may, in fact, need to circumvent these higher-up structures and provide money directly to the local level, although they may need to build capacity of these local structures at the same time.
At the same time, some clash of competencies is occurring among national and local levels, as national government “deconcentrates” and the municipality works more closely with the ABOs in the compounds. For instance, the Ministry of Health has created Neighborhood Health Committees (NHCs) that vie with the RDCs for control:

There is an antagonistic approach with some. RDC is an extension of local government. But CBOs [are] formed by other ministries. The Neighborhood Health Committees are part of the Ministry of Health and it brings a bit of tension. The NHC doesn’t want to be under RDC. They won’t tell you what they’re doing [GKCt].

So while the RDCs attempt to exert their authority over development in the community, arguing they represent residents’ interests, the NHCs argue that they have the authority of the national government and that they, too, represent the community. The RDC also could potentially clash with the coordinating committees created by the national government, which controls much of the budget to support municipal and community investments. The issue now is whether these agencies can reach agreement on areas of competency and institutional relations, and still provide significant space for independent local (community and municipal) action. This lack of clarity and clash of competencies may limit how much communities can drive development, or may cause CDD to get lost in the institutional brambles.

The lack of participation by most residents and the weak integration of the ABOs into the overall system of governance are worrisome. Both are needed if the ABOs are to be accountable, viable, and useful. Although many residents are aware of the ABOs, a very small portion of residents actually participate in ABO elections (Hall et al. 2003). For example, Kanyama has about 90,000 people. Each zone has about 3,000 residents, but only about 60 residents in each zone participated in the last elections. (Elections for many compounds were held after the review, so these figures may have changed or be different for other compounds.)

PROSPECT’s effects on building capacity within the LCC and on creating the political, legal, and financial environment needed to sustain the ABO structure after the
end of PROSPECT are unclear. ABOs, especially at the RDC level, did not seem to have engaged strongly or consistently with PROSPECT staff in the development of their organizational capacities. Although some RDCs are finding funding from sources other than CARE, few focus-group discussants could clearly describe their needs-assessment or fund-raising strategies [CCJr; CCJz; GKCr; GKCz].

They acknowledged CARE’s assistance in the past but were uncertain of the future:

The relationship with CARE has been that of mother and child. It has been the only NGO to work in Chaisa. The face of Chaisa has changed from what it was four years [ago]. We are now able to sit down and vision. We have a leadership that is quite an—I don’t know—for lack of a better word, a leadership that is ready to meet the challenges of the compound. We have been exposed to a number of workshops where we can stand and fare, even international. We are still looking for capacity-building from CARE during no-cost extension. Strengthening is needed. We shouldn’t say we have enough [CCJr].

The focus-group members from the older compounds (George, Kanyama, and Chapata) used a number of vivid metaphors to describe the situation [GKCr]:

CARE is a friend who has packed his bags and now is at the door chatting. There is no serious issue. Otherwise, they might miss their plane.

They are packing their small bags. And saying bye-bye. And we have knowledge. It has left us with knowledge. If they want to see the RDC going ahead, they must leave us the tools, by that I mean, the machines, megaphones, graders, shovels, vehicles.

One exchange among participants particularly underscores the uncertainty that the ABOs have about their future and clearly outline the consequences if they are not yet able to work entirely on their own.

We are limping with a crutch. And if they go, we will slow down our pace...until my leg heals.

And we can walk...[or]...we will just sit.
This lack of clarity about their own capacities and about what CARE’s exit strategy contrasts, for some, with other NGOs like JICA. For these older compounds, CARE has “already left”:

After CARE or PROSPECT moved out, we feel we were somehow not much considered, in that CARE or PROSPECT knows that [in] this group, the community we are dealing with, most are vulnerable. CARE would know that...they don’t have anything. Maybe something to generate funds for them. JICA implemented a lot of projects...but before they went, they took into consideration how these groups were going to work because they knew these groups had been working and performing well because of their support. If you have a child or baby that is breastfed, you cannot just wean the baby, well, no, you can stop breastfeeding, [but] you cannot wean a child just like that. You must do it step-by-step. So JICA did it bit-by-bit, reduced their support, and came in and told the group that you are supposed to group yourself so we are able to give you a hand, and so you can carry on with this work....That’s why they left something. They left 6 million [kwacha] that they gave to the group. They said this money is supposed to be taken back to the group...[GKCz].

PROSPECT management suggested that the ABO members’ lack of knowledge and uncertain capacity are due to the fact that, with the reinstitution of elections, many RDC members are new. But at least half of ABO members in all focus groups had years of experience working with CARE. On the other hand, the comment highlights a genuine threat: membership turnover among the ABOs can easily pose a challenge to sustaining their capacity. This suggests CARE has to develop an institution-building strategy that will maintain the capacities of the ABOs over time, even with new elections.

*Empowerment and Social Ties*

Under the one-party state and socialist bent of previous governments, communities came to expect that the state or the party would provide everything from social services to jobs. One of the principal accomplishments of PROSPECT has been to make the community aware of its own responsibilities and capacities. “[Before] the initiative was not there. But now because of putting the initiative, they have come to
know that if they want to live decently, they must do [it] themselves” [CCJr]. Although activities have not been as well planned or as effective as possible, PROSPECT has undoubtedly contributed to increasing community capacity to plan for development and engage with a range of development actors. The community has learned it has the right to make demands on its elected representatives, and the activities themselves have improved social ties among residents as they work together.

Organizational and Community Capacities

Staff Vision and Training

Discussions and comments from PROSPECT management and CARE senior advisors make it clear that, in the past, PUSH II and PROSPECT had significant, effective emphasis on reflection and organizational learning. As explained above, staff were empowered, well-trained in participatory methods, and conscious of their part in a process-driven project. The PROSPECT strategy fit within the overall strategy and mission of the country office.

With the maturation of the project, that focus was lost. Current PROSPECT IB staff could not articulate how their actions fit into an overall strategy, now or in the past, or how they were working to ensure transition and sustainability. They could not meaningfully articulate CARE’s contribution to CDD or governance. Staff themselves described their actions as reactive rather than strategically supportive. Staff showed little depth in analyzing the project, its strategies, or its effects, often explaining what “should have happened” rather than what actually happened in response to questions [Prs]. Community residents did not talk about any especially structured activities with clear objectives with CARE either. As detailed above, the disengagement of CARE from the communities was palpable, and neither had a solid idea of what had been accomplished, what the next goals were, nor how to accomplish them.

These exchanges raised questions about whether current staff have the needed skills and understanding to support PROSPECT’s transition. The low levels of staff
understanding and energy may be due to the fact that PROSPECT expected to close in early 2003. Many skilled and experienced staff have left. But learning, empowerment, and ownership should be priority tasks for any process project. PROSPECT’s current situation may simply highlight how projects change over time, and how projects that support CDD and scaling-up must plan well for transition and ending. In PROSPECT’s case, at perhaps the most crucial time in transition, when the need for supporting and training local structures to be sustainable was greatest, the most capable staff left.

Financial Resources

As with any successful development project, a CDD program must have sufficient resources to implement planned activities. With PROSPECT, funding seems to have been sufficient. The more serious threat to sustainability comes from not having sufficient funds to continue ABO operations, once the project ends.²

The ABO offices will not require substantial amounts of money, but current sources are unsure.

Operationally we are just institutions that have been put into place, minus direct funding. The RDC is an office which needs some little bit of money. There are things we cannot just go and apply for a project asking for 20,000 kwacha [$4.00]. Even if it is only 500,000 kwacha per year, that’s okay. Some money for chairman’s transport, some stationery...even the bank accounts we have done with our own money. We feel there must be some funding for the operation of the RDC. For now there is CARE, but if CARE goes away, they are not there [CCJr].

The water scheme is supposed to provide the RDC (but not the ZDC, which also need funds) with 5 percent of its operating revenue. This seems to be a good idea, and takes advantage of synergies among projects (IB and II). It also wisely redirects community revenues back to the community itself. While a good idea, there are problems. The system is not fully functional, and needs to be institutionalized. For now,

² Though not the focus of this study, a similar concern occurs with respect to the water systems. Apparently there are enough funds for operation and routine maintenance, now that they have been constructed, but no reliable source of money for major repairs or replacement.
funding is inconsistent, potentially too small, and may be withheld, until the water scheme is better established.

The amounts from the water scheme are not large, say the RDC members in Chaisa. “Maybe Chaisa is just started with the 5 percent. The scheme doesn’t have money [say 70,000 kwacha/month, or about USD14]. Yes, we accept and appreciate that amount. But it’s not even enough for a transport for a week. We need some additional, some IGA that will be generating income” [CCJr].

“In Chibolya, the scheme hasn’t paid the RDC for five months. I don’t know why. If we ask, they say we are interfering just because we are asking for that 5 percent. We got the message from CARE that the RDCs are interfering” [CCJr]. “We were told we were interfering with the running of the water scheme...saying we were always ask[ing] for money for the management.” Another explained: “We are told that we must wait until the trust is legalized. And we are still waiting for that” [CCJr].

If the water schemes do not generate surpluses, of course, the ABOs will get nothing. And it is unlikely that the municipal government will allocate funds to these ABOs: after all, one of the motives for decentralizing was to reduce municipal budget commitments.

**Voluntarism**

One consistent plaint throughout the life of PROSPECT has been that the work done by community residents is entirely voluntary. The community workers who build the infrastructure must donate their time. ABO members also do not get paid, although members of the water and microfinance boards now get a “sitting allowance.”

CARE and DfID’s insistence on voluntarism was due to concerns that FFW created dependency and led to a lost sense of community ownership. “Many projects were unfinished or not kept up because they were not owned by the community. They [even] had names. There is the ‘World Bank Project,’ they would say” [CCJr]. Mobilization of community labor for the voluntary contribution of labor is thus an essential part of the tasks of the RDCs. But the conditions of voluntarism have
potentially allowed only certain groups of people to participate and excluded direct benefits to the neediest. “One problem was the poverty level,” said one RDC observer, “because people who are coming to participate in these programs, they come to look for food. Otherwise, they look for work, so at the end of the day they can have something to eat for their families. There is a lot of voluntary work [on the project], so people used to shun the project” [CCJr]. “We are saying that voluntarism is very difficult to sustain. All of us here are breadwinners, but while we are here, our families are saying ‘Your father is coming with a loaf of bread’” [CCJr].

Focus-group respondents seemed to accept that the laborers were not paid, but raised questions about why those on the water and microfinance boards received an allowance, while those on the ABOs did not. Not even the community residents believe that they do not receive some sort of financial benefit. “The community will be saying you are getting something. They don’t believe we are not getting anything. They say how can you work so hard when you are not getting” [CCJz].

The well-known problems surrounding provision of public goods emerge here: free-riding, private burdens for public consumption. Residents realize that although the individual benefits from knowledge, the greater benefit is to the community: “We just do voluntary work. We are not paid anything. And we can go to the workshop and be there for quite a long period of time, and we are not paid anything. Just bread and drink and nchima. We just go and spend a lot of hours and your children are crying and they want food” [CCJz]. When you leave, said one, “you have taken just a cup of tea and knowledge” [CCJz]. “And so it benefits the community and not the family” [CCJz].

The contentiousness surrounding voluntarism is receding, however, as institutional arrangements become more established. The ABOs are now raising their own funds, and they can design their own programs, in which they may choose to pay laborers. As noted, CARE has also worked to secure nominal “sitting allowances” for board members on the water and microfinance boards. The two main problems in sponsoring an allowance for ABO members, however, are that the ABOs do not yet have a stable source of financing, nor is it clear who on the ABO should get an allowance. As
discussed below, the more pressing need is for money just to support the daily operations of the ABOs. ABO members in the focus groups did not ask for stipends for themselves, but rather for funds to ensure effective operation of the ABO in the community [CCJr; GKCr; GKCz; Npr]. CARE has also begun to experiment with contracting paid community labor for the work on infrastructure [RC]. The issue of voluntarism will likely occur in all CDD projects. While its resolution may differ with the circumstances, one clear principle is to ensure that all actors understand responsibilities and benefits from the beginning, and that rules are applied fairly and consistently. In financing arrangements, community labor in any case should be included as part of community inputs.

Monitoring and Evaluation

A core principle of PROSPECT was the creation of a learning environment. This implies an efficient, effective use of information. As discussed above, PUSH II certainly—and later PROSPECT—do seem to have possessed this perspective, but it diminished over time. An important source of information for learning and monitoring performance is a project’s own management information system. A project intent on scaling up may need one more than most as an effective system will allow the organization to adapt and change as it expands. An effective system would also provide the appropriate incentives to keep the organization focused on CDD. PROSPECT’s monitoring and evaluation system appears to have been weak in both these areas (Hall et al. 2003).

PROSPECT has developed a toolkit of participative methods, survey instruments (including the PANA), and training resources that encompass its participatory approach and ideology. A recent review, however, finds them “fundamentally unchanged since early PUSH II days,” despite recommendations in the PUSH II evaluation. PROSPECT’s own instruments for performance and impact evaluation are not internally consistent among themselves or across time, nor are they synergistic across interventions (Hall et al. 2003).
Baseline surveys and follow-up surveys were also not adequate to measure livelihood gains among participants or the communities, especially social and political capital, which were among the most important potential outcomes of the project. These shortcomings deprive PROSPECT of an evidence base from which to learn and on which to make decisions about future project direction or design subsequent interventions (Hall et al. 2003).

In discussions, staff concentrated more on outputs than impact, apparently assuming that concrete outputs and structures would lead to impact [Prs]. But building sustainable institutional capacity requires more than creating outputs. It must ensure the environment exists for the outputs to be used. Yet PROSPECT currently has no study of how to progress beyond its outputs, no concrete strategy for its Institution Building, as it does for other components. PROSPECT apparently not yet made any study of key questions about how these structures work, their weaknesses, and potential strategies to strengthen them. Key questions to ask would include how representative the ABOs are; how successful they are at increasing community participation and trust in government; how capable they are of leading development; how much community residents interact with them; how they are incorporated into municipal planning; how financially, legally, and politically stable they are; and what needs to be done to address weaknesses.

PROSPECT also has not coordinated with other databases or agencies to explore potential synergies in information. ZAMSIF, for example, has created and managed a national poverty database. But PROSPECT has interacted little if at all with ZAMSIF, perhaps losing an opportunity to influence national poverty assessment standards and policies based on PROSPECT’s experiences with the urban poor (Hall et al. 2003).

Another surprising result is that ABOs in non-PROSPECT areas seemed to have as good a grasp of the concept of community development and of the roles and responsibilities of the ABOs as those in PROSPECT areas. Some members from PROSPECT areas felt they had greater capabilities than those from non-PROSPECT compounds: “We possess more knowledge than those from non-PROSPECT areas. We can stand and contribute and articulate” [GKCr]. A focus-group interview with five non-
PROSPECT compounds, however, indicated that even in these areas, ABOs were established and functioning: council staff had given them training in leadership and democracy, and they generally had good relations with their councilors. Although this represents experience in only five of the remaining 21 non-PROSPECT compounds, it does indicate capacity among council staff to carry out work similar to that done by PROSPECT.

In the end, then, neither staff nor available documentation provided convincing evidence of causal impact on critical institution-building issues and their influence on livelihood outcomes. This conclusion leads to various questions: What did CARE do? How did it expand its impact to others? What was CARE’s unique contribution? Is CARE even needed? But CARE should be able to provide convincing evidence of the effectiveness of its approaches to donors (thereby promoting change among the donor community to support its approach). Answering these questions will also provide fodder for internal reflection, learning, and change.

Organizational Impacts of Expansion: Internal Links and External Synergies

Project growth has meant increases in staff size and in staff organization, but PROSPECT handled this fairly routinely. Other changes seem to have occurred naturally, and gradually as a result of project maturation. The change from a process project has been described above.

Scaling up CDD requires mounting a level of intervention above the household and even above the community. Perhaps most visibly, new stakeholders became involved as PROSPECT’s activities changed. PROSPECT resisted this at first, and even tried to skirt engaging with the government. Soon, however, PROSPECT management recognized that a successful project would require technical expertise beyond the community and appropriate legal frameworks. “The intervention needed to be well-coordinated with government and city policy and requirements (in many cases, water would come from city mains). We were in a situation of questionable groundwater supply. Designs and procurement processes would be complex” (Hedley 2003).
Consequently, PROSPECT’s list of stakeholders and partners has expanded over the years. From the initial community residents on the RDC, stakeholders and partners now include the city water supply, the municipal council, national local government ministries, and even donors interested in democratic governance (such as Ireland Aid).

PROSPECT also led or influenced other projects that emerged to support CDD or to replicate the approach elsewhere. For example, the Urban Insaka initiative came about when other organizations began demanding information about PROSPECT’s community-driven approach, catalyzed by a CARE conference on urban livelihoods in Birmingham in 1998. Urban Insaka’s goal was to document the process and synthesize lessons learned. C3 was established to fund community-initiated projects, a necessary support to CDD. Mahavita in Madagascar and CULP in other cities in Zambia are direct descendants of PROSPECT, and they basically replicate its approach.

PROSPECT’s engagement with these stakeholders and influence over new projects has given it credibility and allowed it to make valuable and widely-recognized contributions to new policies, programs, and institutional strategies. However, PROSPECT has failed to capitalize on the full range of opportunities that its presence permitted (Hall et al. 2003). Observations for this study revealed a lack of coordination and synergy with internal initiatives as well. A few community proposals to C3 languished and missed deadlines when brought up through the PROSPECT structure (though, in other instances, PROSPECT staff were instrumental in getting information to communities, which then applied for C3 directly). Although Urban Insaka exists as a unique opportunity for organizational documentation and learning, PROSPECT has made little effort to take advantage of it. Exchanges to date have been limited, and organizational incentives are lacking for them to work with each other. Links between PROSPECT and CULP have been scarce after the initiation of CULP, and in that sense each has not learned as much as possible from the other. CULP, for instance, seems to have maintained the CDD focus lost to PROSPECT, and CULP encountered political problems with councilors opposed to the spread of the ABO structures, predictable from PROSPECT’s experience.
Exit or Transition?

PROSPECT is now ending, which means CARE’s funding is ending as well. But whether CARE has created sustainable structures to continue CDD is not certain. As noted above, PROSPECT has lost some of its emphasis on process, and on building capacities that go along with that; it has concentrated on the existence of schemes, institutions, or agreements rather than on efficient functioning for sustainability of the ABOs. Thus, the transition strategy is incomplete. As in a traditional project, it emphasizes “phase out” and “shut down” when transition to different types of interventions and support may be more appropriate. In the long term, certainly CARE should scale down and phase out, and to a large extent CARE’s work is done in terms of restructuring the ABOs and altering the institutional landscape so it incorporates and supports them. But CARE has not yet thought strategically about how to make this arrangement sustainable. Rather, when asked, staff say, “Well, we haven’t finished so we keep going. Bits and pieces are left” [Prs]. What those bits and pieces are, and how CARE should support them strategically so that ABOs become a protected, integrated part of the institutional arrangements and a key component of CDD, has not yet been determined.

Maintaining Community-Driven Development

From the point of view of establishing ABOs as part of the local government structure, PROSPECT has had success. But was it, or has it remained, community-driven? Does the PROSPECT experience suggest there are organizational threats to CDD that emerge over time in the process of scaling up? Although it is of major significance that the city council now promotes and supports the establishment of ABOs in each peri-urban compound in Lusaka, it remains to be seen whether ABOs are sustainably established so they will continue after PROSPECT’s end.

First, although PUSH II was almost certainly a community-driven project, a “process project,” PROSPECT seems much less so. Water supply was undoubtedly a
priority in the compounds where PROSPECT worked, but was it really the highest priority? The denoting of the “triad” of interventions (IB, II, MF) itself suggests that activities were determined before the PANA, and not as a result of community demand.

Hall et al. (2003) cast further doubt on how much the community drove project selection and implementation, and how much PROSPECT worked to build the robust, sustainable operation of the ABOs. In Chaisa, for example, the RDC has implemented a drainage project on its own, but it was not one of the top 11 projects identified in the needs assessment.

Of course, these observations do not necessarily mean that PROSPECT was not community-driven. Water may indeed have been the highest priority in all areas. Or CARE may have predetermined the set of interventions it would sponsor, and the community could still have identified its own needs through the PANA and then worked to meet them independently of PROSPECT. That seems to have been the case in Chaisa.

Although PROSPECT could have done more to establish and promote CDD, the communities still seem to have agreed that getting a water system in place was a high priority. It is just that other aspects of the project drove the process as well. For example, the initial compounds were chosen for a FFW program. These were peri-urban areas where the municipal government hardly entered, and which, as part of the FFW program, needed infrastructure. These peri-urban areas were unlikely to be part of the municipal water system and likely to have water as a principal livelihoods issue. As a result, the ODA review did not discourage PUSH II from continuing to build infrastructure.

The final evaluation of PUSH II, as it transitioned to PROSPECT, actually encouraged a focus on water. The report stated: “Water appears to have been a major element in the success of all components of PUSH II, and the existence of a serious water problem (plus the possibility of a technical solution) should be a primary criterion in selecting new compounds” (Barton, Crapper, and Tempest 1997). The formal selection process developed later specifically cited the “lack of infrastructure” as a key criterion. The PUSH II final evaluation then seems to have suggested a reversion to the more
traditional project model, where the project’s intervention, rather than community need, more directly drove the process.

Over time, PROSPECT changed from a process project to one increasingly focused on activities. PROSPECT’s change in the initial terms it used to describe interventions from “personal empowerment” to “microfinance,” and from “social empowerment” to “institution-building,” tracks this transformation (D. Hedley, personal communication, 2003). The shift also reflects a feeling among project leadership that it just “wasn’t going to be possible to begin planning water projects after PANAs had identified the need. It would have taken years to get the process underway in each compound” (D. Hedley, personal communication, 2003). This sense of urgency replaced the focus on process. In actuality, with good planning, any “delay” need not have been much longer than the time needed to conduct a PANA. In any case, CARE phased in water projects over a period of years, so implementation took years anyway, and often long after initial planning. In the end, a genuine community priority for water, evaluations that encouraged water schemes and shifted the focus from CDD, and donors that stressed outputs over process led to PROSPECT’s own emphasis on water schemes (and microfinance) in the transition from PUSH II. As a result, the focus shifted from process to specific activities of previously determined project elements.

CARE would argue that PROSPECT simply used water as an entry point for community empowerment and overall community development and that it was not meant to be a water-service-provision project. But PROSPECT’s IB staff or documents do not bear out this argument in any convincing fashion. ABO members from older and more recent compounds agree that water was not the sole mandate of the ABOs. They are perhaps clearer on this point, commenting that, “The major item was water first of all; the other items would come later” [CCJz], and “Our focus was not only water. But we couldn’t do them at the same time” [CCJz].

A pure process project, truly driven by the community, is difficult to fit within the planning structures and budget cycles of governments, donors, and implementing organizations. Generally a donor intends to target a particular area with a single project,
and so it needs to know how much to budget. How often are donors willing to dedicate a specific amount to an area, regardless of purpose? How often are they willing to forward regardless of amount, if it has already determined the purpose? Wouldn’t the donor need to know, say, whether it will finance costly infrastructure or less expensive microfinance groups? Potentially the donor could consider funding separate phases, with community assessments and project preparation in a first phase, and then a second phase of funding the selected intervention—although some might argue this would delay response to community needs. And others could then argue that without a participatory assessment, this response could be misdirected? In actuality, the ODA review recommended a two-step process. First, CARE and communities should undertake participatory studies. They should then design the project and only then request funding.

This recommendation was unusual, and most donors continue to focus on outputs, and not process. This is partially a result of how projects are structured. Even though community participation may be encouraged, the project focus (say, water or health) is already known. Participation and output are thus part and parcel of the same project. A potentially more beneficial model would have some projects focus on developing capacities and proposals, and other, separate projects provide funds to respond to those individual community-identified needs. These funds could respond across an array of needs, but would not confine themselves to any one geographic community. In this way, “the project” would respond to community needs.

With the more widespread availability of social investment funds to which communities can apply for assistance, despite the potential for delays, the two-stage approach suggested by ODA seems more in line with the sorts of structures needed to support effective CDD. In Zambia, for instance, ZAMSIF (Zambian Social Investment Fund) and CARE’s C3 program can play this role. But procedures must be streamlined to respond as quickly as possible to community needs, and donors should know how to promote these sorts of funds (which may involve working around their own institution’s processes, cycles, and operating procedures).
It may seem that these observations imply it is in the nature of any project, even a community-driven one, to become less process-oriented as it moves from conceptualization to implementation. This is not necessarily so. CULP is another CARE project that has worked on a vast array of projects identified by the community. We can also contrast PROSPECT with Mahavita, an urban livelihoods program in Madagascar modeled on PROSPECT. So far, although younger than PUSH/PROSPECT, Mahavita appears to have maintained a focus on community empowerment and choice, even as it undertook FFW projects with the communities.

In broad terms, both PROSPECT and Mahavita followed similar steps in working with communities to build capacity:

- conduct a needs assessment,
- identify priorities,
- note where CARE has funds to meet that priority, and
- work with communities to find ways to meet other needs.

Mahavita focused less on project implementation and more on producing a community development plan. In interviews, Mahavita staff were clear about keeping overall community development at the forefront (Garrett 2003). As such, the staff and community stakeholders of Mahavita realized that CARE funded rehabilitation of community infrastructure (canals) as a first project, but this met only one of many needs. Staff recognized that they needed to work with the community-based structures to find funding for identified priorities (though they did not generally succeed and clearly needed greater guidance here!). By following these steps sequentially with communities, project staff can assist communities in building capacity to understand planning, write proposals, relate to donors, raise money, and manage all aspects of a project.

Mahavita’s work then emerged as step-strategy to build capacity: without forgetting the other needs, CARE would support projects for which it already had funds (canal rehabilitation in this case). This would give the community structures the
opportunity to manage a project. The explicit strategy then had allowed the communities to develop the capacity to determine community priorities, design a community development in response, and design and manage a project. The community structures then were to rely on this experience when seeking funds to meet the remaining needs, a process with which CARE would assist. One of the best ways to build community capacity (or the capacity of any partner) is to help them do something concrete and meaningful (Hall et al. 2003). PROSPECT did not possess such an explicit strategy. At present, neither PROSPECT nor Mahavita has been very effective at building the capacity of community structures to reach out for funding beyond CARE. This is a major aim of the second phase of Mahavita, while PROSPECT currently has no formal plan to work at this before it closes down.

8. Conclusions

Scaling-up is ultimately about spreading impact. It has multiple dimensions that emerge as the project itself, still focused on its goals and principles, changes over time. Table 1 captures these multiple, often progressive and overlapping, dimensions of scaling-up and highlights the fact that multiple dimensions require multiple layers of actions and engagement with different stakeholders at different times.

Recognizing this explicitly is useful for planning and strategic purposes. PROSPECT’s experiences illustrate some of these aspects of scaling-up. PROSPECT has been a process project, with a strong component of adaptability and learning. It had an initial focus on empowerment and worked on creating the internal and external environment to favor change. PROSPECT’s early years especially evince an ability to learn and change, as it added activities and revised manuals and procedures.

In large part, PROSPECT has been successful. PROSPECT has developed links with many stakeholders, especially the LCC. Officially, ABOs are part of government; the municipality has taken on much of the responsibility for expanding the structures and
for training their members. This is strong evidence of scaling-up, which will then allow the project to scale down.

Strong conceptual thinking and experience continue to exist at the top. Project management and CARE senior staff generally possess a deep understanding of development processes and the political environment. PROSPECT is in an enviable position within CARE to leverage other resources and support its strategy to leave a legacy of sustainable CDD. Urban Insaka can assist in documenting procedures and lessons. With an extension, C3 can be a source of funds for ABO projects. Sustainable scaling-up, however, will require PROSPECT to work further to strengthen and institutionalize the ABOS on a number of fronts: obtaining financial stability through revenue sources or allocations; political and legal stability through clear and accepted roles, rules, and responsibilities through enforced constitutions and bylaws that players abide by; and technical and administrative capacity of ZDCs, RDCs, councilors, and council staff. These elements must exist within a system that flows needs and plans up, and resources and an enabling environment down. PROSPECT must also transform itself—its activities and its staff—if it is to scale up and meet the changing needs of the project and its stakeholders.

**Lessons for Scaling-Up**

Against this backdrop (summarized in Table 2), we may draw a few lessons:

1. Successful scaling-up inevitably requires project staff and management to learn and adapt their approaches and activities to local needs and conditions. Careful piloting and systematic review of lessons from other projects can help, but still it is important to scale up processes or the broad outlines of an intervention, not simply replicate the mechanics.
### Table 2—Summary highlights

| **INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS** | Funder: PROSPECT: ODA (now DFID), PUSH II: also WFP  
ABOs (RDCs and ZDCs), the focus of this study, are responsible for overall community development and liaison with Lusaka City Council (LCC) |
|-------------------------------|---|

| **CAPACITY ELEMENTS** | Training of ABOs, councilors and council staff (leadership, democracy, conflict resolution, gender, etc.)  
Working with councilors and council staff to develop policies and programs |
|------------------------|---|

| **TRIGGERS** | ODA review mission and focus on process projects  
CARE’s desire to continue work in peri-urban areas once PUSH I ended  
CARE senior staff commitment/background in participatory development |
|-------------|---|

| **FACILITATING FACTORS** | National policy of decentralization, need for community representation  
Need to bring peri-urban areas under municipal authority  
Recognition that national/municipal government did not have resources to supply services  
Donor (funding, philosophy) and country mission support  
Capacity building among staff in participatory methods/learning organization  
Partnered with government  
Had resources available  
Prestige and “weight” of CARE  
Began smaller and grew over time |
|---------------------|---|

| **LIMITING FACTORS/CHALLENGES** | Government lack of interest  
Political obstacles  
Donor frameworks and requirements  
Focus on outputs, budget setups and cycles, monitoring and evaluation indicators  
Resources to respond and build capacity  
Staff capacity and skills  
Sustainability of focus on community over time  
Transformation and transition  
Staff, funding lines, stakeholders, activities  
Weaving sustainable CDD into social and institutional fabric  
Spreading to other |
|-----------------------------|---|

### SCALING-UP PROCESSES

| **Quantitative Scaling Up** | Expanded operations from 3 to 11 compounds  
Facilitated integration of ABO into municipal governance structure for all compounds  
Assisted in finding funding for ABO initiatives |
|-----------------------------|---|

| **Functional Scaling-Up** | Added environmental health, gender, and HIV/AIDS components  
Linked with other projects like KAR (urban waste management program)  
ABOs constructed clinics and police posts and community centers  
Expanded down to create and support ZDCs  
Supported creation of ABO federation  
Expanded up to build capacity among council staff and councilors, and sit on national boards |
|-----------------------------|---|

| **Political Scaling-Up** | Service delivery: FFW built infrastructure (PUSH I)  
Community capacity development: redirected ABOs  
Policy reform: integration of ABOs into local governance structure; member of NDCC; promotion of federation of ABOs  
Social movements/leadership entry into politics: some RDC members have become councilors |
|-----------------------------|---|

| **Organizational Scaling-Up** | Cross-training and cross-sectoral coordination of CARE staff  
Training of ABOs and LCC members, council staff  
Connecting ABOs to water schemes for revenue  
Assisting with finding donors, writing proposals  
Spin-offs and incorporation of RDCs in other structures |
|-----------------------------|---|
This means the promoting organization must be a learning organization. Staff must have a keen understanding of the principles of CDD; they must be willing to empower communities, and also be analytical, flexible, and responsive. For this to happen, staff must be well-trained, and project management (and above) must actively promote a similarly empowering and learning environment for staff.

To regain its learning aspects and better understand how to institutionalize scaling-up, CARE still needs to develop better mechanisms to elucidate its impact. In PROSPECT, evaluators had little hard evidence of CARE’s specific contribution to creating sustainable, effective government structures or to sustainable livelihoods. PROSPECT lacked a rigorous methodology for evaluation to complement the focus-group information, and provided little detail on CARE’s role in the redirection and spread of ABOs and how they have influenced community participation and livelihood security.

Staff argued that, among other things, this was because PROSPECT is a process project or that no further research was needed, that responding to donors was unnecessary, that the most important thing was having impact at the community level. But even in a “process project” and most important when CARE desires to improve its impact, CARE has to be able to delineate what it did, what impact it had, and why. Without this, CARE has no means to identify what levers are important, what strategies work (especially if it intends to argue that the strategies of other donors, consulting firms, or operational organizations are flawed). Importantly, this may suggest we need a new language to talk about evaluation of impact and of sustainability among facilitating organizations. We may need to identify new indicators and new benchmarks to identify “impact,” shape the monitoring and evaluation system, and convey credible stories of contribution and influence to donors, and promote internal learning and change. But that also involves greater reflection within CARE than has been the case so far for strategically changing the project, mission, governmental, and donor environment.
2. Simplistically, scaling up CDD requires communities to be able to make demands, and authorities to be able to respond. If authorities do not have the technical capacity, will, or resources to respond, CDD will almost certainly fail. Government authorities, with no resources, have little reason to concern themselves with community needs or demands. With no response, communities have little reason to concern themselves with government. Instead, they will get discouraged and the structures will become moribund. Authorities must be able to validate and energize the connection with the community, and respond to the community’s “drive for development.”

Of course, this depends not only on individual institutional capabilities and resources but also on how the larger environment constrains or promotes their actions (including whether the appropriate legal structures or other mechanisms for communication and action even exist). PROSPECT profited from an enabling national environment that was emphasizing democratic openness, decentralization, and the emergence of a multitude of parties. PROSPECT worked to link as well as increase the capacities of both the demand and supply side of promotion of CDD. It energized and redirected existing community-level governance structures and was the catalyst for an ABO constitution that clearly outlined roles and responsibilities of council, RDC, and ZDC.

PROSPECT built capacity and understanding among communities and service providers and linkers by providing formal training for ZDC and RDC members as well as council staff and councilors. It funded water projects that the communities had identified as priorities. Working along side communities and council staff on a daily basis until they are able to operate satisfactorily on their own seems to be a sensible strategy. PROSPECT still needs to assess where different communities are in terms of sustainability, which ones have PLAs (participatory learning assessments), which ones have expertise to design projects, experience to raise funds, and so on. This sort of
continual evaluation of the institutional landscape would seem to be a prime requirement for successful scaling-up.

3. CDD will almost always involve reallocation of resources and creating or reforming governing institutions. As a result, politics will almost certainly enter the picture. The PROSPECT experience shows that the project cannot and should not avoid politics. If ignored, authorities and others who feel threatened or excluded can act to undermine the project, whereas if the program engages them, they may work to support it. They may leverage funds, influence or recruit others, or advise how future plans or pitfalls may affect the project.

In a pilot phase, a project usually keeps local political authorities well informed. It does not pose a threat to the political system as a whole, and local authorities often welcome the project as bringing in extra funds. But the scene changes when the political structures are scaled up. As these structures often control or manage substantial resources, and are seen as having responsibility for the project (rather than, as before, the local political authority), the local political authority comes to see them as a threat to their position. At the same time, they may view the project as an opportunity to consolidate their position, if they can become involved. They may want and may deserve some say about how resources are allocated or institutions reformed or set up. Politics will almost inevitably arise in the process of scaling up CDD, particularly in an urban environment where political players are thick and the opportunities for interference rife. A successful project will anticipate and develop a strategy to deal with it.

Acquiring local political support is one basic element of that strategy. PROSPECT mistakenly avoided political engagement at the beginning, but ultimately used a consultative process to get buy-in from stakeholders (councilors, council staff, RDCs, ZDCs). This process, and additional training, clarified roles, alleviated fears, and helped councilors to see how the ABOs could help them carry out their responsibilities instead of threatening to overtake them. The process created workable, participatory,
non-threatening community structures. Any strategy, however, should recognize that the political actors are multiple and varied; there is no “one” government actor, so scaling-up will require communicating with multiple actors, understanding their concerns, needs, and perspectives, and engaging those concerns in a meaningful way.

Scaling-up also needs to clearly identify the place of the ABO within the local government structure. In Lusaka, confusion resulted when ABOs were supposed to be simply CBOs, yet were clearly connected (often through the councilor) to city government. Councilors were ex officio members of the RDCs; some councilors felt they should control the RDC, and also be voting members. The current arrangement makes the RDCs and ZDCs lowest levels of local government, although they are supposedly nonpartisan. After the consultation and preparation of the new constitution, councilors now accept that RDCs are integral parts of local government. It remains to be seen whether the RDCs and ZDCs can continue to function as true voices of the community, or whether they become as partisan as previous RDCs were.

Mahavita in Madagascar presents a different model, however, because it is in the early stages and is not yet sure how effective that model is. There, the municipal government designates a committee to operate as the neighborhood authority. Residents elect a committee, a CBO, separate from this community authority to liaise with the authority, coordinate development activities in the community, and represent their interests before the government. The most important thing for reducing political interference in the case of both Mahavita and PROSPECT, however, seems to be that all stakeholders are clear on rights, responsibilities, and roles.

4. Successful scaling up of ABOs, as key representations of CDD, does seem to require that the ABOs attain some sort of official recognition. PROSPECT scaled up “successfully” because the government took on the ABO structure and wove it into the social and institutional fabric. The council adopted and expanded the “redirected” ABO structure to all peri-urban areas in Lusaka. That would seem to be the very definition of successful scaling-up. The project has moved from an
individual accessing of benefits to incorporation into government structure. It now has to prove effective at improving city planning and promoting community development.

Of course, CDD need not be an explicit part of government, but if the local structure intends to be the voice of the community for overall development, it does seem necessary that it be part of government or have some (preferably officialized) interaction with it. Otherwise, the structure lacks authority to speak for the community or coordinate activities. If the ABO is intended to push or coordinate plans, it needs to have an official relationship with government. A multi-action CBO has no “convening authority” on its own—it still needs the backing of law.

5. Scaling-up also means making changes in project activities as the project matures and development occurs. Different stakeholders become more or less important with changes.

For the communities, this emphasizes the importance of an approach that stresses capacity building and creates linkages and partnerships so communities can effectively address their chosen priorities. The role of donors and government is to work to build these community capacities and create an institutional and legal framework, and an environment, where CDD can occur.

From the perspective of the facilitating organization, the need to allow for program evolution means that the need for particular staff skills also changes, perhaps even necessitating shifts in the composition of staff. Scaling-up is not “community-contained,” but instead is a process of transformation and maturation that necessarily extends beyond the community to other stakeholders and structures. Self-criticism and intellectual engagement outside the project are essential. Without openness to institutional learning, project staff risk becoming insular and intellectually stagnant, “replicating” rather than adapting successfully to the challenges of scaling-up.
Once ABO structures were revitalized, for instance, attention turned to training them and to supporting the council’s work with them. Now that the mechanism for this is in place, resources for operating these structures and responding to their demands are needed; this shifts the focus to working with ABOs on fund-raising, identifying donors, and working with the LCC and ministries for budget allocations. These community structures may also clash with the competencies of other governmental authorities: the focus shifts from training the ABOs to facilitating communication among various stakeholders.

The need to respond to changing needs of stakeholders as CDD matures also casts a different light on the termination of the project. “Phasing out” applies only to specific activities. Without suggesting that CARE attempt to perpetuate itself ad infinitum, PROSPECT might “phase out” ABO training as the council staff take on that responsibility. But PROSPECT (or CARE) may simultaneously need to take on new activities, such as continued advocacy for rationalizing competencies. This implies transformation of CARE’s aims and role in promoting CDD and good governance—that is, the nature of the interactions with stakeholders changes, not simply “phasing out” or “shutting down.”

6. Project termination, rather than “transformation” also creates staffing difficulties. Staff often see the end of the project as the end of employment and leave, especially well-qualified ones in high demand.

PROSPECT, for example, was scheduled to end in early 2003, but received a no-cost extension for about a year. PROSPECT now faces the need to transform and to undertake new kinds of activities, but many experienced staff have already left. If CARE and donors had agreed earlier on how to “transform” the project, with staff continuing in their position until CDD was reliably and sustainably part of government, perhaps these staff would have stayed.
At some point, of course, CARE’s assistance *should* end—and the paid positions along with it. But this brings out the need for organizations like CARE to develop organizations to be going concerns, with competent staff that can, for the most part, work permanently at the organization, moving from project to project as required. Although, eventually, government or national organizations should replace CARE, in developing countries such as Zambia, international NGOs are still required to facilitate processes, engage in dialogue with stakeholders about policy, obtain funding, and strengthen and interact with partners on multiple levels. These are some of the tasks remaining to ensure PROSPECT’s accomplishments are sustained.

7. Donors must provide the right incentives for stakeholders to act to establish and promote CDD, especially through their monitoring and evaluation systems. Donors have a strong tendency to focus on physical outputs and financial flows to gauge the success of a project. Almost all development projects, and most especially CDD, should be both process- and results-oriented.

Donors should resist planning impacts and indicators before community needs have been identified. They should instead set up monitoring and evaluation systems that gauge how successfully the facilitating or implementing organizations (say, CARE and the local government, respectively) are engaging the community, putting participatory and operating mechanisms into place, establishing a propitious environment, and building capacity to act.

Rather quickly, donors should also identify what tangible, measurable benefits they expect as a result of the facilitating environment and increased community and government capacities. This increases the pressure on local NGOs—the implementing agents—to perform and achieve results. Likewise, the facilitating organization, such as CARE, has additional responsibility to monitor the NGOs and make sure they have the capacity to take action. This focus on building capacity but then measuring it terms of tangible results ensures that the focus remains on understanding that CDD is supposed to
help achieve greater and more lasting development results, not that the capacity is an end in itself.

Pilot projects are especially important, then, because they allow the facilitating organizations to work out the bugs in their approach and also because they allow the donor to avoid committing funds for the long term (should a project turn out badly) and to assess and change the project as it develops. Governments and the development community need to develop a new language for monitoring and evaluation that encourages the appropriate balance between process and results. Monitoring and evaluation for CDD must emphasize learning and institution and capacity building in the early years, and then begin to hold agents accountable for tangible outcomes that later result from these actions. Donors, governments, and facilitating and implementing organizations should consult on how to set up such an evaluation system and how to adjust budgeting mechanisms to support such a project when it is driven by community capacities and needs that are not always identifiable at the project outset.

Interestingly, though more in CULP than PROSPECT, donors forced the issue of sustainability by not providing sufficient funding to support CARE’s work. CULP had to work within strict budget limits and with available structures. Creating new structures would have required additional financial resources. CARE then simply did not have the opportunity to create structures and processes that were not sustainable. To achieve impact, CULP managers had to think strategically and negotiate the political environment. Though this process took longer and was more hazardous, it means that when CULP ends, the structures are less likely to disappear: they already exist and are owned and supported by the government and community.

8. The effectiveness of delivery depends to a large degree on the capacity of CARE and partners to carry out the process. Scaling-up requires not only the appropriate enabling environment but also sufficient financing for the short- and long-term and capacities of all the players to take advantage of and play their roles in this environment.
PROSPECT has focused more on training outputs and not on ensuring that ABOs are effective and functional and able to carry out CDD. Although PROSPECT did help to build other infrastructure in response to community demand, such as police posts, latrines, and offices for planning agents and water revenue collection, the major focus was still water schemes and microfinance. From the outset, PROSPECT should have identified which actors would carry out project activities; developed and implemented a program of capacity building and responsibility transfer; and made each step in this plan clear to project counterparts (along with assessing its own effectiveness in carrying out the plan and modifying actions as needed with time). As it stands, counterparts simply knew that “CARE would leave,” but they had little idea of what they should do when it did leave. Neither did they nor CARE have markers along the way to guide them in achieving their goal of taking over project management.

Funding will also be a severe challenge to growth and consolidation of CDD. The challenges come not only from the usual problem of “lack of funds,” but also, at the local level, from the attempt to establish new mechanisms and institutional arrangements to raise those funds. At higher institutional levels, national and municipal governments and donors must be realistic about the resources needed to scale up effectively, as it involves not just building something or carrying out a service, but developing human capacities and establishing new ways of doing things. And scaling-up means doing this multiple times.

One way to marshal and make most effective use of resources would be to develop a framework and language for CDD that would be a primary strategy for the national PRSPs. Governments and donors could then identify how existing approaches and resources support CDD and what actions, perhaps involving only limited additional resources, could catalyze these to implement CDD more widely as part of a poverty-reduction strategy. Clearly, this may not involve “scaling up” specific CDD projects as much as “scaling out” and spreading community-driven approaches.

Overall, PROSPECT’s experience is a useful illustration of the changes and challenges that affect initiatives to promote CDD over time. While integration of the
ABOs into local governance structures is a major accomplishment, a genuine example of scaling up CDD, this study makes clear that PROSPECT’s longer-term impact is currently at risk. Attention and action, if taken now, can preserve its impact and provide additional examples and insights into how to successfully, sustainably scale up CDD.
Annex: Interview List

CCJr  RDC members from Chaisa, Chibolya, and Jack compounds.  May 27, 2003.

CCJz  ZDC members from Chaisa, Chibolya, and Jack compounds.  May 27, 2003.


CnIlr  George Nyendwa (Chaisa) and Christopher Moluzi (Raphael Chota).  May 29, 2003.

GKCr  RDC members from George, Kanyama, and Chipata compounds.  May 23, 2003.

GKCz  ZDC members from George, Kanyama, and Chipata compounds.  May 23, 2003.


RC  Rose and Catherine.  Rose Chimanga (PROSPECT project coordinator) and Catherine Kadimba-Mwanamwambwa (assistant project coordinator).  May 17, 2003; June 3-5, 2003.
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