CASE STUDY

BRAC: Anatomy of a “Poverty Enterprise”

Manzurul Mannan

Management of the poverty alleviation process has created a new form of poverty enterprise. This enterprise provides poverty-production-market linkages, and in the process, it combines three features: a nonprofit nongovernmental organization, a for-profit nongovernmental organization that has established an internal market, and a profit-making industrial and business concern. This article explains how BRAC (Building Resources Across Community) in Bangladesh has used poverty to transform itself from a tiny relief distribution organization into the world’s largest poverty enterprise. This enterprise is characterized by contradictions between its public claims and actual practices.

BRAC (BUILDING RESOURCES ACROSS COMMUNITY) is the largest development organization in Bangladesh. It has attracted international attention for its capacity and efficiency in providing various services to 110 million poor men and women (Chowdhury and Bhuiya, 2004; Halder and Mosley, 2004). BRAC started its development journey in 1972 as a small relief organization with a few employees. It now employs over 100,000 staff to carry out development activities in sixty-nine thousand villages in Bangladesh. It has also expanded its activities in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and several African countries.

In 2009 BRAC is representative of a conglomeration of organizations that typically combine three features in complex ways. The first feature is projection of the image of a nonprofit nongovernmental organization comprising an education program, a health program, and a social development, human rights, and

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legal services program. Second, the BRAC economic development program, with a strong microfinance component at its core, displays the features of a for-profit nongovernmental organization that transfers profits from its business operations to the BRAC poverty alleviation program and vice versa. Finally, BRAC operates many profit-oriented business enterprises, including industrial concerns, a bank, and a university.

How can one explain the phenomenal growth and complexity of BRAC operations? How does it manage, govern, and hold together its diverse activities under one umbrella? The BRAC umbrella also encompasses a diversity of theories, ideas, and research programs. There are numerous studies on various aspects of BRAC (Bhuiya and Chowdhury, 2007; Chen, 1986; Feldman, 2003; Korten, 1980; Lovell, 1992; Smillie, 1997). The perspectives of scholars in understanding the development and organization of BRAC have already been questioned by development managers (Mannan, 2006).

This article attempts to explain the black box that is BRAC. The assumption is that a capital accumulation process takes place in BRAC as it mobilizes the resources of the poor, donors, and markets. This unique process can be partially explained by the way that BRAC operates its savings and credit operations, creates and sustains an internal market, and commissions new business enterprises. These aspects are all intricately entwined. This article is built on the ideas of many BRAC staff, along with local information that I have collected over a period of seventeen years. I articulate the ideas here to place them in a broader perspective.

**Savings and Credit Operations**

The Economic Development Program is the backbone of BRAC; it revolves around the savings and credit operations, which are programs through which BRAC distributes loans and collects savings from its beneficiaries. The savings and credit operations combine the advantages of a standard bank with mechanisms long used in traditional group-based modes of informal finance (Murdock, 1998). A first step toward managing the savings and credit operations was the selection, formation, and mobilization of target groups in “village organizations” (Mannan, Chowdhury, Bhuiya, and Rana, 1995; Rafi and Mallick, 2002). In village organizations, BRAC applies peer pressure on group members to attend weekly meetings, save and borrow money, and repay through weekly installments.

The Economic Development Program has developed its own banking principles to fit the realities of poverty. The rationale behind introducing a banking system is that a pure credit-led system may not be sustainable in the long run because the financial resources required may not be readily available. BRAC follows the principle that funds for lending should come from the interest on
loans borrowed by its group members and interest on savings should be paid. The interest income must be sufficient to meet the operational costs and maintenance of financial reserves for default. The growth of financial capital must be ensured by investing in different income-generating activities and businesses. Thus, the interest spread between loans and savings becomes critical to BRAC's banking policy.

**Savings Operation**

An important precondition of BRAC's banking is its savings operation. The target population, once they join BRAC, starts to build the habit of saving, no matter how small the amount. BRAC introduces two types of savings: weekly personal savings and enforced savings. In weekly personal savings, members of the village organization deposit a minimum of BDT 5 to a maximum of BDT 20 per week (BDT stands for the Bangladesh taka unit of currency). Many group members can save more than BDT 20, but BRAC does not allow or provide for deposits greater than its policy limit in order to maintain a steady group-saving pattern. The assumption is that if a few members are allowed to save more, then it may disrupt group feelings and destabilize the group equilibrium. Early on, group members were entitled to withdraw savings only consistent with the policy of BRAC, not at will (BRAC, 1992a).

In enforced savings, group members are required to deposit 5 percent of the principal amount of a loan at the time of disbursement. The assumption is that forced saving will enable the poor to accumulate tangible and intangible capital, which they can use to climb out of poverty. In reality, BRAC does not return enforced savings to individual members. Similarly, a decade ago, BRAC temporarily introduced a group trust fund to which all members contributed 4 percent of their loan to BRAC's capital. This was used to develop a proper banking system as a pilot project in ten branches in 1994. As group members were allowed to withdraw savings, it had a phenomenal effect on deposit and saving mobilization. All pilot branches experienced growth 171 percent greater than control branches (Zaman, Chowdhury, and Chowdhury, 1994). Restrictions were relaxed in 2005, and BRAC allowed its members to withdraw total savings (BRAC, 2006).

**Credit Operation**

Savings is a prerequisite to get a loan. The process of loan disbursement suggests that a credit-led system can be replicated on a large scale, which has the potential of meeting the credit needs of many poor people, provided that these activities are run according to rigorous banking principles. However, nongovernmental organizations grew in the absence of any government regulations (Jackson and Islam, 2005). The Bangladesh government did not introduce a Micro-Credit Regulation Act until 2006. Nongovernmental
organizations are allowed to determine their own interest rates on loans, which has sparked debate on what could be appropriate interest rates for the poor.

The two most important components of lending operations are the method of charging interest and repayment of interest. Until 1994 BRAC charged 20 percent interest against borrowing, but since it follows a principle of reducing balance, the interest rate eventually declined to 11 percent and now is an annual flat rate of 15 percent interest. However, the flat rate is 15 percent of the face value of the loan; since the loan is paid off in weekly installments, the average value of the loan in the client’s pocket is half the face value (Rutherford, 2000). The effect is that the effective rate of interest on 15 percent loans stands at around 40.8 percent (Ahmad, 2007).

In its defense, BRAC claims that its interest rate is lower than the rates charged by local moneylenders (Begum, 1994). Moneylenders’ annual rates of interest usually exceed 100 percent. Lower interest rates reflect a widespread belief that interest is inherently suspect and that the high rate of interest is exploitive (Rutherford, 2000).

The method of calculating interest leads to accusations that BRAC siphons off money from the poor by charging excessive interest on loans, and it has been criticized on moral grounds. Critics know that BRAC receives interest-free money from Western donors, but when these donations are converted into credit, BRAC charges shud (interest) on loans. Shud is viewed as an un-Islamic act for three reasons: it tends to generate greed and selfishness and stifle human compassion; it promotes habits of indolence, since the lender, instead of seeking a return on labor, will be inclined to live on the labor of others; and it places all risk on one party, leaving the others with assured gain (Ghazanfar, 1981).

The issue of shud in the Islamic society of Bangladesh also comes into conflict with Islamic values in other ways. Many religious leaders are convinced that culturally insensitive credit operations are linked to the process of de-Islamization, in which Islamic faith and beliefs of women are systematically deconstructed and distorted to induce a belief that Islam cannot free the poor from abject poverty (Mannan, 2004). Thus, the question of interest divides credit sharply into moral and immoral money (Mannan, 1998, 2009).

All nongovernmental organizations tell their donors that poor people are good risks with a near-perfect repayment rate of 99 percent. The high rate of repayment reflects a statistical gimmick, however, rather than actual practice. For example, say that a woman receives a loan of BDT 4,000 and she has to pay weekly installments of BDT 100 ($1.40). The average monthly income of 41 percent of the households in Bangladesh is BDT 4,000 (Ahmad, 2007, p. 24); that is, daily income is BDT 133. This means one can
repay weekly installments with one day’s income. This is indicative of
the fact that nongovernmental organizations do not fix the rates
of interest based on any standard financial formulas, but rely on
the capacity of the poor to repay their loans.

BRAC’s Internal Market

The poor of Bangladesh are distressed borrowers who lack cash.
When poor people struggle for their survival every day and do not
have enough food, they do not think about innovative ways to in-
vest borrowed money in markets, ensure safe returns from invest-
ments, secure profits, and pay back loans with interest. Rather,
they need lump sums of money for events such as birth, educa-
tion, marriage, and death (Rutherford, 2000) rather than for in-
vestment in income-generating and productive activities. They are
willing to accept any amount of a loan to meet their requirements,
which often are not clearly investigated, understood, or thought
through.

Roughly one-third (37 percent) of poor borrowers invest pri-
marily in small business and rural trading (Ahmad, 2007). These
borrowers gain the capacity to repay, but the majority of borrowers
run the greater risk of default. This reality entails formidable chal-
 lenges for BRAC, which must take precautionary measures to pro-
tect its capital, including its assets circulated as loans. This can
best be done by preparing the poor with skills and knowledge of
production to invest and survive market competition.

In responding to these concerns, BRAC shows ingenuity with
numerous income-generating projects to ensure the safe partici-
 pation of poor people in production and marketing, which in turn
makes the credit viable. BRAC continuously innovates projects for
investment and coaching to stimulate the creation of new ven-
tures. The Economic Development Program undertakes experi-
ments and pilot projects with poor beneficiaries in different areas
of business. The most successful projects are selected for imple-
mentation. These projects protect women beneficiaries in particu-
lar, as women have restricted mobility in a male-dominated society
and market.

Most of the projects are creatively linked to markets. For ex-
ample, BRAC runs the largest poultry industries in Bangladesh.
The poultry industry requires feed for its birds; maize is the main
ingredient. Thus, BRAC established a chain of contract farmers
who buy hybrid maize seeds on credit. BRAC then buys back the
harvest at predetermined prices to produce poultry and cattle feed
at its own feed mills. These poultry industries produce day-old
chicks, both layers and broilers, and sell to group members on
credit. Women become chick rearers, key rearers, cage rearers,
brouter rearers, and egg collectors. What they produce is collected
by BRAC to process in its automated broiler processing plant to
supply the dressed chicken to meet the demands of a growing market. In this way BRAC creates, in effect, an internal market.

Through participation in this internal market, the women group members transform themselves into commodity producers for BRAC. These “women are an under-tapped resource as sources of labor, and as consumers” (Fernando, 2006a, p. 24). BRAC considers them market customers (BRAC, 1994). Its training and resource centers play an important role in providing training on various productive skills and knowledge for these women. The pool of small-scale commodity producers protects BRAC’s capital and uses their household means of production and labor. BRAC’s control over its small-scale producers means that these people cannot sell products on the open market at higher prices; rather, they must accept the prices offered by BRAC’s marketing outlets. This policy may appear exploitative, but it protects women producers from open market competition.

BRAC’s success is that savings and credit operations increasingly support projects and other businesses to ensure the growth of internal markets. The more group members take up BRAC-designed projects, the more its businesses and trades flourish. In a way, BRAC protects female small-scale commodity producers, but competes directly with male entrepreneurs by establishing alternative channels in urban and international markets. The production of commodities on a small scale frequently leads to integration in credit and input markets through the creation of channels for high-level integration into product markets. In this way, savings and credit operations are linked to market-friendly projects and products that are produced by the beneficiaries (or small-scale commodity producers).

The small-scale producers’ participation in BRAC-designed systems may also have turned them into the resource poor who earlier lacked capital, knowledge, and skills, but now enjoy some comfort by acquiring new resources and expertise with access to cash. However, they are largely unable to change and escape from the cycle of poverty. BRAC claims that poor borrowers benefit from its loan operation as they escape poverty and accumulate assets (BRAC, 2006), but this claim contradicts a recent finding that shows that income from BRAC-related activities is significantly lower than income from other sources (Ullah and Routray, 2007).

**Capital Accumulation: Profit-Risk Mechanism**

The creation of an internal market and control over small-scale producers may foster the image that BRAC uses the source of poverty to sustain the financial viability of its organization, or what is popularly known as “doing business with poverty.” Investment in poverty is itself a risky venture because of the contested notion of profit and risk involved in the investment of capital in microcredit operations at the level of poverty. Profit is not viewed

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as merely immediate gain of money after deducting the cost of investment on loans and labor of producers. The security of capital comes from evolving a system whereby the borrowers are locked in once they participate in village organizations and continue to borrow from BRAC until they are exhausted or default.

The sustainability of BRAC depends on a continuous transfer of risk of investment to the beneficiaries, but in the process of transferring risk, it accrues a capital surplus. Table 1 shows the profit-risk transfer mechanism to describe who gets what.

The profit-risk mechanism, if placed in perspective, opens an interesting dimension of economic dependency of both BRAC and its beneficiaries, with each perpetually locked into a relationship of economic transaction. In the first year, when members borrow money, capital remains at risk for BRAC while group members consider it as profit. In a distress situation, poor people consider any amount of cash in hand as profit. In popular perception, the investment of BRAC is seen as risk. As one informant remarks, “I have taken a loan of taka 2000, but in my village there are two hundred group members. These members have taken more than taka 500,000. Thereby, it is in BRAC’s interest to work with us rather than us working with BRAC.” These comments should be viewed with the understanding that BRAC cannot withdraw its activities from localities once it invests and circulates money as loans to its group members. Until the end of the first-year loan cycle, when BRAC realizes the full loan with interest, its capital remains at risk.

BRAC’s risk is gradually reduced as new borrowers understand the logic of savings and credit operations. Village organizations play an instrumental role in orienting and familiarizing members with BRAC’s philosophy of credit transaction through indoctrination in the ideology of empowerment. The empowerment ideology emphasizes the exploitation of the poor by the traditional structure (Desh, Kal, Samaj, 1990; Mannan, Chowdhury, Bhuiya, and Rana, 1995), but it does not explain to the poor how neoliberal market orthodoxy creates a new form of discrimination and inequality. The empowerment ideology is more than “purely symbolic resources and arguments, but resources that may be politically invested by the social actors (such as government, or nongovernment organizations) to particular ends” (Seidel and Vidal, 1997, p. 59). BRAC’s empowerment may be a case

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<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>BRAC</th>
<th>Group Members</th>
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<td>First year</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Profit</td>
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<td>Second year</td>
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<td>Third year</td>
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Table 1. Profit-Risk Mechanism
of making women visible without power for the entrenchment of microcredit ideology (Fernando, 2006b). In this way, empowerment embraces a political economy that uses a culture of shame in a subtle way to exert pressure on women to repay the borrowed money to NGOs (Karim, 2008). Despite the empowerment rhetoric, BRAC has not yet produced any tangible information on how many poor people have attained economic empowerment and how they moved out of poverty.

The risk of capital becomes smaller in the second year for BRAC with the acceptance of second loans by group members. Now the poor want to obtain more loans and engage themselves more with BRAC’s project activities. The situation remains “risk-profit” for BRAC, but the second loan becomes a “profit-risk” situation for members as they become entrapped in the second loan. Borrowers gradually are forced to surrender the freedom to manage their domestic economy and social life to the NGOs (Fernando, 2006a). However, this entrapment is a difference of perspectives about what empowerment actually means: gradual dependence on or independence from NGOs. For BRAC, the more one participates in projects, the more one is empowered.

A senior staff member takes the view that group members should not try to become independent, arguing, “Why should they become independent as groups are continuously receiving finance and benefits from BRAC?” The idea of creating independence is surrendered in favor of making group members dependent on BRAC. Independence from BRAC may also mean the loss of trained and skilled persons who work for internal markets. A careful reading of BRAC’s credit manuals (BRAC, 1995, 1997) may lead readers to infer that BRAC policy is to provide loans to able-bodied married women but not unmarried women.

In the third year, BRAC profits as members accept a third loan, but the loan itself creates a risky situation for the large numbers of members in a highly imperfect market. BRAC’s capital is protected in the third year when about 10 percent of borrowers reach a stage of critical mass. This occurs when borrowers joined BRAC “more than two and a half years ago, and have taken cumulative loans to the value of taka 7,500 or more” (Mustafa and others, 1996, p. 34). Sustaining the BRAC model greatly depends on how it maintains the equilibrium between critical mass and the size of village organization. In 1991 BRAC calculated that a branch office becomes financially viable when it circulates money amounting to BDT 7 million ($175,000) (BRAC, 1991).

In the fourth year, BRAC continues to accumulate capital, but the amount of profitability depends on the cycle of rise and fall of households to reach the critical mass. Critical mass is also an important stage because not only do significant numbers of households fail to reach this stage, but many households show a decline after attaining critical mass when they borrow more than BDT 7,500
loans (Mustafa and others, 1996). The process of participation in village organizations leaves many group members vulnerable, and BRAC periodically expels the defaulting members. For example, BRAC has expelled 102,814 (16 percent) defaulting members (BRAC, 1992b, p. 15).

Scaling Up and Capital Accumulation

The process of profit-risk management creates perpetual pressure on BRAC to scale up projects. Scaling up requires recruiting more group members, opening more branch offices and village organizations, and developing more economic projects to engage group members.

In concrete terms, two types of scaling up occur. The first type is additive scaling up, which has several forms. It may result from simple replication of activity to vertical integration where an existing activity is strengthened by establishing forward or backward linkages between market and production. Scaling up may also involve horizontal integration, where a program that begins with one or two components has other components added to it. The second type is multiplicative scaling up, where each additional input by the sponsor brings forth more than a proportional return (Howes and Sattar, 1992). Because it concerns savings and credit operations, scaling up means to grow organizationally by recruiting new poor clients in village organizations and to grow financially by encouraging group members to take on bigger second or third loans.

The capital accumulation process in BRAC occurs through the expansion of organizational outreach as well as the scaling up of projects by ensuring ever-increasing participation of group members in different project activities. The money that BRAC earns from both savings and loan interest must immediately circulate to new members in its effort to scale up operations. The rationality of the circulation of money in the opinion of a credit expert is, “We do not keep money in the bank, because the bank gives less interest, but we accrue more interest from lending to group members. Thus, the money that we earn must be immediately recirculated.”

BRAC recirculates money that it earns to new members in village organizations. This might force BRAC to turn to male clients through its Micro-Enterprise Lending Agency (MELA). MELA sets off an upward spiral of investment and income, allowing clients to borrow ever-larger loans. The rationale for such policy is based on the assumption that the marginal costs of making smaller loans, of the kind required by the poorer women borrowers, are higher than the marginal costs of making larger loans, more likely to be taken up by wealthier male borrowers.

Bank, Business, and Enterprise

In the context of the prevailing 60 percent poverty rate in Bangladesh, BRAC has to compete with two thousand other microcredit
organizations, including Grameen Bank, to finance the poor (World Bank, 2006). Investment in the poverty sector is not a viable option, but BRAC must look to business sectors to be financially sustainable. Otherwise ambitious growth may indicate that BRAC is at risk of financial chaos. BRAC annually “needs an estimated amount of $50 million of additional funding to get back on its feet” (Fernando, 2006a, p. 32). This deficit could be reduced if BRAC is able to double its income with a required growth at 7 percent annually and requires organizational income from business at 6 to 8.5 percent annually for ten years (Terry and Mueller, 1997). Thus, BRAC has to rely on both poverty and nonpoverty sources, but the more it diversifies income from nonpoverty sources, the more it comes under pressure to recruit poor people in increasing numbers by expanding its internal market.

Importantly, the management of internal markets also impels BRAC to operate as a bank for the poor. Its approach is not to link group members to formal banks as part of an effort to bring the poor into the mainstream of financial life, but to operate as a bank on behalf of the poor and then to link BRAC to the formal banking sectors. This strategy created an opportunity for BRAC to seek access to external finance as an indispensable process to invest the poor’s money for setting up new businesses. The implication is that BRAC is able to invest money in business as well as emerge as an investment house. BRAC innovatively transforms itself into a financial institution, but its fast-growing industrial and business enterprises are not financed by BRAC Bank. Instead, it borrows heavily from commercial banks. In 2006 its total indebtedness to those banks stood at $91 million (BRAC, 2006).

BRAC uses the weakness of the broader financial policy environment in its favor to maintain a bank. The seed funds for BRAC Bank come from two sources. First, the Shorecape Exchange Corporation provided $1.5 million financial support to BRAC (SEC, 2007). The second source of capital comes from its poverty alleviation program when BRAC transferred more than BDT 30 million ($600,000) to BRAC Bank (Rana and Ahmed, 2000). BRAC Bank now has assets of $255 million (SEC, 2007). This bank has brought many innovations like mobilizing savings from the general public. For example, BRAC introduces BDT 700 crore ($879 million) “BRAC bonds” to agriculture to meet the ever-increasing loan requirements of farmers (“BRAC to Launch Tk 700 crore Farm Bond,” 2007, p. 1). In collaboration with Western Union, BRAC Bank also is replacing an illegal international money transfer system (Hundi) used extensively by Bangladeshi overseas migrant workers.

**BRAC: A Poverty Enterprise**

BRAC is unique in its ability to design activities to attain financial sustainability by using both the low-income poverty market and...
nonpoverty business activities. This has transformed it into a new form of “poverty enterprise” that is not a nongovernmental organization, a social enterprise, or a business concern. This enterprise links poor people, donors, government, civil society, and business into complex poverty-production-market networks. The poverty enterprise continuously conceptualizes and designs its repertoire of development programs against the multilayered and multidimensional poverty canvas embedded in the diverse and dynamic reality of the lives and livelihoods of poor people (Abed and Matin, 2007). BRAC flourishes by employing three strategies: it depends on donors as a nongovernmental organization, accrues profit from business enterprises, and earns income by controlling the labor of small-scale producers in internal markets.

This poverty enterprise has evolved over a period of almost thirty-eight years through a process of adjusting to, accommodating to, and growing with the investment in the poverty process. It has evolved through three phases. The first phase was shaped by development imperatives (1972–1990). It started with donor-financed microcredit operations that were “social: how to form groups in ways that would most effectively enforce collectively responsibility? How to motivate women to form their own groups? . . . How to respond to negative responses from the better-off and the religious groups in a community?” (Abed and Matin, 2007, p. 1). As an outcome, BRAC promotes, as do other nongovernmental organizations, a value-driven social movement occupying a “high moral ground” (Holloway, 1997). It sought to build a consensual society by addressing social injustice among the overpopulated poor class in the most remote villages. It adopted the conscientization approach to empower the poor (Rafi, 2003); conscientization is a translation of the Portuguese term conscientização, which is also translated as “critical consciousness” (Freire, 1972). This approach has allowed BRAC to represent particular nonmarket values and also to enter into the political process (NET, 1980).

The second phase came about with institutional imperatives (1990–2000). BRAC needed to discipline itself in light of ever-increasing activities that gave rise to a development bureaucracy. It reengineered its governance, program management, and organizational structures to find synergies between its development objectives and business plan. In 1997 it adopted a strategic plan to become more of a business corporation by 2007 rather than a pure development-oriented organization (Terry and Mueller, 1997). It also dealt with two issues: how to serve the poor while staying efficient as an organization and how to combine subsidized programs with revenue-producing programs. Like most other nongovernmental organizations, BRAC draws its development inspiration from neoliberal market orthodoxy (Mannan, 2005), which transforms them into profit-oriented, market-driven entities seeking to provide services at lower prices than commercial competitors. This
invokes questions of how best to creatively link the poor to the market (Mair and Marti, 2007).

The current third phase (post-2000) is a response to market imperatives. Gradually BRAC has shifted from donor-financed microcredit to market-financed microcredit programs under an economic rather than a social model. The BRAC model, although rooted in the effort to alleviate poverty, is always searching for alternative avenues in the business sector for funding and financial sustainability. This has to be understood in the context of expectations of dwindling donor grants but growing confidence of commercial banks in nongovernmental microfinance institutions.

**Conclusion**

As a poverty enterprise, BRAC has developed a self-governing system that retains the zeal of philanthropy but is ruled by the profit motive. Leadership of the poverty enterprise is always under pressure to explore all possible sources—market, donors, philanthropy, and disaster—to maintain organizational growth. The multiple realities of poverty are an advantage to BRAC but also a problem. BRAC’s overture to business is being challenged by civil society. Since 1994 it has faced periodic religious opposition from rural society (Mannan, Chowdhury, and Karim, 1994; Rafi and Chowdhury, 2000; Seabrook, 2001). The civil society actors challenged the operation of a bank by BRAC, a voluntary organization. Bangladesh’s High Court ruled against the operation of the BRAC Bank, but the Supreme Court overturned the decision (Sidel, 2004). BRAC was even fined for evading taxes (Jonakhontho, 2001).

A reality is that market dynamics create poverty, but BRAC uses the same market to generate capital to address poverty. This has led to the situation where BRAC can transfer capital between the nonprofit voluntary sector and the for-profit business sector, a process that has blurred the boundary between nonprofit and for-profit. BRAC’s leadership provides a classic example of how to draw a linkage between global markets and poverty to ensure the organizational growth of poverty-alleviating agencies. This creates new forms of engagement, relationships, and capacities (Abed and Matin, 2007).

**References**


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