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Social Investment Incentives and constraints that guide social investment This paper examines the possibility that social investment can, under the right conditions, address market failure by side-stepping government failure through a careful choice of intermediary structures. >p>The paper discusses social investment, the support of nonprofits, social businesses like Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, and profit-maximizing businesses serving the poor. It states that:
There can be no presumption of a fortune at the bottom of the pyramid, particularly when serving the poorest communities. Moreover, financial strategies like securitization have sharper limits in the social investment context, and contrary to popular belief, higher profitability alone cannot deliver higher leverage.
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